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Abstrakt 
Prvotným cieľom práce je preskúmať vývoj daňových systémov krajín OECD. 
Kladie si tiež za cieľ určiť podobnosť i rozdiely vo voľbách krajín OECD ohľadom 
stupňa, štruktúry a systému zdanenia; v mnohých prípadoch za posledných 
štyridsať, alebo päťdesiat rokov. Práca sa snaží zachytiť niektoré z týchto výberov 
rôznych krajín, ktoré neboli uskutočnené v žiadnej inej krajine OECD. 
Práca podáva výklad toho, čo sa zmenilo a čo ostalo rovnaké, ako i povahy 
a možnosti daňových reforiem krajín OECD do budúcnosti. Poskytuje čitateľovi 
porovnania medzi krajinami, sústrediac sa prevažne na to, ako ďaleko zašli tieto 
spoločné trendy a postoje vo vývoji, do akej miery šli krajiny svojou vlastnou 
cestou a ako pravdepodobné sa zdá, že budú v svojej ceste pokračovať 
v niekoľkých nasledujúcich rokoch. 
Abstract 
The primary aim of the paper is to examine tax systems developments of the OECD 
countries. It also aims at identifying similarities and differences between the main 
choices of the OECD countries, with regard to tax levels, structures and systems: 
in many cases over the last forty or fifty years. The paper also tries to pick up some 
choices made by particular countries, not to be found elsewhere. 
It describes what has changed and what has remained the same, as well as the 
nature and likelihood of tax reforms of the OECD countries in the future. This 
paper provides comparisons between the countries, concentrating in particular on 
how far common trends and attitudes have emerged, how far countries have gone 
their own way and seem likely to continue to do so over the next few years. 
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1. Introduction 
The primary aim of the paper is to examine tax developments of the OECD 
countries over the last forty years and to describe what has changed and what has 
remained the same, as well as the nature and likelihood of tax reforms of these 
countries over the next few years. This overview provides comparisons between the 
countries, concentrating in particular on how far common trends and attitudes have 
emerged, how far countries have gone their own way and seem likely to continue to 
do so over the next few years. 
Paper is divided into 6 chapters. What is generally summarized in the 
introductory chapter is discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. The 
chapter looking at individual countries (in different OECD regions) is preceded by 
three general chapters that discuss issues which are not country-specific. Chapter 2 
is devoted to trends in tax policy, where in the subchapter the tax trends in the last 
fifty years by decades are described. Personal income tax, with its history and 
structure, is the main topic of the Chapter 3. Family taxation and taxes on labour 
and work supply are further outlined there in 2 subchapters. 
Chapter 4 illustrates possible choices in the design of the main taxes in the 
OECD countries. It is divided into Europe and Non-Europe OECD region, where 
country coverage is restricted to chosen OECD countries. This chapter aims at 
identifying similarities and differences between the main choices of the OECD 
countries, with regard to tax levels, structures and systems, in many cases over the 
last forty or fifty years. The chapter also tries to pick up some choices made by 
particular countries, not to be found elsewhere. 
Chapter 5 offers a few guesses on how tax systems might evolve over the 
next fifteen to twenty years, and ends up with the question: "Will tax systems 
converge?" 
Use of acronyms 
For the personal income tax, I frequently use PIT. I frequently use CIT for 
corporate income tax, and SSC for social security contributions and VAT for value-
added tax. DIT is used for dual income taxes. TTR is being used for the ratio of the 
total tax revenues to GDP. 
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2. Trends in Tax Policy 
2.1. Introduction 
The world of taxes changed a lot since the year 1900. Tax levels increased 
almost fourfold and main sources of tax revenues have completely changed. In 
1900, the greater part of government revenues was driven from selective taxes on 
consumption (import duties and excises) with property taxes on land and buildings, 
then as now providing revenues for local government being the next most important 
revenue source. In some countries, in 1900, there was a relatively unimportant 
personal income tax (PIT) on the rich few, though never a capital gain tax. In those 
days, corporate income taxes (CITs), social security contributions and general 
consumption taxes were virtually non-existent. The rise in the tax levels over the 
twentieth century as a whole was due to the introduction and subsequent increase of 
four new forms of taxation: 
1. The personal income tax, usually introduced between 1880 and 1920, had by 
the end of the World War 2 (in 1945) been transformed from elite to a mass 
tax. 
2. Between the two World Wars, most industrialized countries adopted general 
consumption taxes, taking the form of cascade taxes in central and Eastern 
Europe and single-staged sales taxes elsewhere. Both were subsequently 
replaced by value-added taxes. 
3. Also between the First and the Second World Wars, most countries 
introduced corporate income taxes, which since 1955 have tended to account 
on average for between 8 and 10 percent of government tax revenues. 
4. Since the World War 2, the growth of the welfare state has led to 
introduction and/or rapid increase of social security contributions.1 
Such important revenue raisers of 1900 nowadays play second violin to 
personal income tax, social security contributions and value-added tax. 
Overall trends in tax mixes are illustrated in the Fig. 1. 
1 MESSERE 2003 
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Fig. 1 Revenues of main taxes as a share of GDP (1965-2003) 
OECD average 
Year 
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Source: OECD (2005), own graph 
A question is what constitutes a tax. There is a definition of taxes (according 
to OECD classification of taxes) as compulsory unrequired payments to general 
government. These payments are unrequired in the sense that benefits provided by 
governments to taxpayers are not normally in proportion to their payments. 
The purpose of the OECD standardized classification is to compare the 
weight of taxation both between countries and in the same country over time. There 
is of course a number of additional sub headings, which further disaggregate certain 
taxes according to whom pays the tax (households or business) or whether they are 
recurring (usually annually) or once and for all. 
2.2. Decades 1950-2000 - Generalization 
We may summarize the tax trends in the last fifty years by decades and it 
could be on the following lines. 
The 1950s were the decade of post war reconstruction when welfare state and 
public sector started to grow. There was corresponding growth in total tax revenues 
to GDP ratio (TTR) and especially in the ratio of social security contributions, for 
most countries the preferred way of financing a significant segment of the welfare 
state. 
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In the 1960s there followed economic growth and low unemployment levels. 
Fiscal policy was dominated by a new view that its main function was to act as an 
instrument to regulate aggregate demand, so as to reach the optimum trade-off 
between levels of inflation and unemployment. As a result of this interventionist 
attitude and political consensus for improving the welfare state, total tax revenues 
(TTRs) and especially PIT ratios, continued to rise at a great rate. Many of OECD 
countries were in budget surplus between 1960 and 1973. 
In 1970s stagflation came. First oil shock came in 1973. Little worries were 
felt at the collapse of the fixed-exchange rate system or the commodity and food 
price boom. Move to value-added tax and spread of withholding of income taxes, 
enabled the upward trend of total trend revenues to continue. After 1974 the 
macroeconomic performance in the OECD area had deteriorated and it remained 
poor for the rest of that decade. This led to lot of questions whether the public 
sector growth remained appropriate and whether the efficiency of government 
interventions in the economy could not be improved. There was a slowing growth 
of total tax revenues and it was not matched by a slowing of public expenditure and 
from the mid-1970s fiscal deficits reached post-war records. Fiscal deficits peaked 
in year 1983, when very few countries were in surplus. 
The 1980s brought a further decline in macroeconomic performance with 
unemployment levels often at record post-war high. From that times also comes the 
idea that tax distorts, and from the point of economic efficiency and equity, taxes 
should generally be as low and neutral as possible. The main effect on government 
choices was lowering of income tax rates, broadening of the income tax base and 
flattening of the personal income tax schedule. These changes were revenue neutral 
and overall total tax revenues continued to increase gently. 
The 1990s began with a long period of economic downturn and in 1993, 
deficits reached 1983 levels. Most governments then started with reduction of 
deficits. After moderate increase in total tax revenues, a reduction in the growth of 
public expenditures and extensive privatization at the end of the twentieth century 
nearly all OECD industrialized countries were in surplus and only Japan (-7,4 per 
cent) recorded a deficit exceeding 1,5 per cent of GDP.2 
2 data OECD 
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The Oil Shocks 
The two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979-80 led most OECD governments to take 
a lot of tax measures to encourage the conservation of energy and a more rational 
use of oil. When there has been a conflict between energy policy, transport policy, 
environmental policy, or even tax policy, it was than energy policy that had the 
priority. All this have stopped by the mid-1980s when oil prices had already begun 
to drop. And these days environmental considerations probably had more influence 
on tax legislation then energy policy objectives. What was another consequence of 
oil shocks? It was the fact that in nearly all countries the excise tax on motor oils 
declined sharply in real terms between 1973 and 1982 but thereafter it increased. In 
the 1990s, crude oil prices increased to extreme heights and than plummeted again, 
but with much less effect on OECD economies and on tax measures than in 1970s. 
Fiscal Deficits 
Fiscal deficits caused couple problems between 1960 and 1972. They became 
serious between 1975 and 1982 and declined again during most of the 1980s. From 
1989 to 1993 nearly all OECD countries recorded deficit. This deficit was 
continuing and generally increasing. These days fiscal balance became very 
important to policymakers. This was especially the case of the European Union 
countries, which were obliged to reduce their deficits to below 3 per cent of GDP 
by 1998 as a condition of participating in the common currency area. Of course to 
reduce deficits there was necessary to increase total tax revenues. And this was 
probably the main reason why most OECD countries increased the standard rate of 
value-added tax (VAT) during the 1990s. 
Political preferences 
The left is supposed to prefer higher taxes (especially on income) and higher 
spending in order to increase the role of the public sector in the economy and to 
redistribute income. The right prefers the opposite. Even though in the period of 
sustained growth there was a political consensus in Europe to increase expenditure 
on the welfare state, no matter which parties (left or right wing) were in power. 
Right wing governments and their predominance in the 1980s and early 1990s 
contributed to the slowdown of the increase in total tax revenues. Since then, left 
wing governments have predominated during the late 1990s and right wing 
governments again during the early years of the twenty-first century. The impact on 
the tax policy was usually limited. Political preferences may be one factor 
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influencing government choices on a variety of tax policy issues, for example 
capital gains taxation, the corporate tax system, the appropriate tax mix and the 
choice between tax credits and tax allowances. These preferences can affect tax 
laws. 
Fig. 2 Tax revenue of main headings as percentage of total taxation, France 
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Source: OECD 2005, own graph 
France may solve as an interesting example. A left wing government 
introduced the net wealth tax in France, in 1981. It was abolished by the right wing 
government next in power3 and re-introduced by a left wing government in 1989.4 
Some governments' tax policy choices were influenced by political preferences5 but 
other factors have influenced them in many cases much more. 
Demographic Aspects and Social Influences 
The first aspect of the last fifty years is the growing participation of women 
in the labour force. Nowadays we could observe a two-earner families and it is not 
3 Net wealth tax was abolished in 1987. 
4 In 2003 out of €786 billion "general government" receipts, €174 billion was collected on 
"income and wealth". Data is from the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques. 
5 In 2004, Jean-Pierre Raffarin introduced legislation to reform French Social Security to cut 
costs, thereby reducing its deficit. In both cases, this government had reduced taxes or 
contributions. Opponents, mostly from left-wing parties but also, to a lesser extent, from the 
Union for French Democracy (a centrist party in the ruling coalition), contend that the proposed 
reforms are not good for the country and thus rightly opposed by the population. (INSEE) 
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an exception. The effect on tax legislation has been in most but not all countries to 
change the income tax liability of working couples from a joint to an individual 
basis. The effect of a change from joint to individual taxation in isolation was to 
reduce the tax liability of high-earning couples and increase it for the low-earning 
couples, so making the income tax less progressive. During the late 1980s and early 
1990s many countries have been flattering the formerly steep rate schedules6. This 
has further reduced the importance of the choice of tax unit. 
The second aspect of the last half century was the increase of the informal 
unions and one-parent families. Political and moral problem has arisen, how to treat 
the informal unions, including those with partners of the same sex. If it should 
differ from the treatment of married couples and if not, the technical problem 
arises, of how to cope if the partners of the informal union change. This has 
become a problem for tax legislation only during the last twenty years and country 
solutions differ. There is also a growing number of one-parent families. This, from 
the tax point of view adds to the importance of the existing unemployment trap for 
those whose benefits are high, compared to earnings and the reduction if they 
would enter the formal economy. 
Another problem is ageing of population. The major problem is how far can 
be increased pension outlays financed by taxes on the future work-force and how 
far must they be financed through taxes and savings of the present work-force. This 
problem has become more important in recent years and its importance will still be 
growing in the future. 
Environmental aspects 
The tax system offers a lot of possibilities how to meet environmental 
objectives. One of them is to adjust existing taxes (charge unleaded petrol at lower 
rates, differentiating between petrol and diesel oil which pollute in different ways), 
the budgetary effects of which are insubstantial. A second option is to impose new 
green taxes, which is difficult because of the international competition reasons. 
Such green taxes are in force for example in Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and 
Italy. But they do not have special relevance to tax policy. Usually the principle 
that the polluter must pay is applied, but this is more likely to take a form of user 
taxes. 
6 for example USA 
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Concept of externality means that some effects of an activity are not taken 
into account in its price. For instance, pollution in excess of the socially optimal 
level may occur if the prices a producer pays do not include the impacts (costs) 
experienced by those adversely affected. 
Typically the greatest polluters do not appear to suffer any tax penalty. If 
such a polluter is a monopoly, or/and is of strategic importance to its home country 
(it may be, for example, power plant) this country does not have big incentives to 
levy ecological tax on it. The reason7 may be (as mentioned above) that the increase 
in polluter's taxes will shift the tax burden to consumers, in the way of increased 
prices. A final option is to increase the heavy traditional excises especially on 
motor vehicles and motor fuels. 
Employment Policy 
Several countries have used the tax system in an attempt to increase 
employment, especially during last decade. They introduced non-wastable tax 
credits for the working poor, some countries also provide reduced employers" 
and/or employees" social security contributions for certain industries or for the 
young, for women and for part-time workers. Hutton and Ruocco (1999) have 
suggested that moves from PIT to VAT in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom 
may have had beneficial effects on employment. 
Cnossen (2001) provides a comprehensive review of the trade-offs involved 
in using the tax system to promote employment with other goals such as alleviating 
poverty, increasing productivity and stimulating both the supply and demand for 
labour. Generally, little can be done to increase employment through the tax system 
without damaging other policy goals. An exception perhaps is tax/benefit 
provisions targeted to women and part time workers. Decisions of married women 
to enter the labour force are also influenced by the availability of cheap child-care 
facilities and cultural attitudes. Different types of taxpayers are likely to respond in 
different ways to tax changes. This is not only a question of hours worked, but 
includes readiness to change work location, age of retirement and the form work 
takes (for more details see Subchapter 3.5) 
7 other reason is lower international competition 
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Technological Progress 
Technological progress has contributed to transformation of the relationship 
between tax inspectors and tax avoiders or evaders. With the aid of computers, tax 
inspectors can much easier detect tax evasion through, for example, electronic 
filing and audit selection techniques. But also tax avoiders are better armed due to 
the developments in communications technology. The internet renders such 
traditional benchmarks as "residence" and "source" are difficult to apply in 
practice. It is not very clear, how are the tax authorities going to be able to keep 
track of transactions carried out through the internet. The internet has not yet posed 
too many problems, but once fully commercialized it could have a profound effect 
on the form that taxation takes. 
Administrative constraints 
What the tax administration can deliver, may limit tax policy choices, 
especially in developing countries. Absence of sufficiently trained local 
government tax officials, among OECD countries, may have been one factor 
inhibiting tax decentralization. In the mid-1980s, Australia did not go for a VAT 
largely, because it would have then taken too long to implement. Australia has had 
to wait for more than ten years for another try. Generally any major tax reform has 
to face the test whether it is worth the administrative costs and social upheaval that 
may be involved. 
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3. Personal Income Tax 
Personal income tax belongs in the world to standard instruments of fiscal 
policy. Apart from its fiscal function, it carries also redistribution and stabilization 
function. Almost in all OECD countries it is constructed as progressive, where, 
with the increase of taxpayer's income it moves towards the higher rate. 
It is used to promote many, not always compatible goals, such as vertical 
equity, horizontal equity, economic efficiency, neutrality towards various kinds of 
social and economic decisions.8 There is also a variety of instruments at 
governments" disposal for promoting their priority objectives, such as different 
ways of giving tax relief, aggregation or non-aggregation of spouses" income, 
different degrees of progressivity of rate schedules and offsetting wholly, partially 
or not at all the impact of inflation. All these instruments interact with each other 
in determining the tax burdens of different categories of taxpayers. 
These taxes recorded after the World War 2 the double development. At the 
beginning came an increase of the amount of the tax rates. Conversely number of 
tax rates and their decrease occurred during 1980s of the last century. On the other 
hand came the widening of the tax base, where a number of non-standard 
deductions were abolished and their use was constrained. Taxes are not levied, or 
are very low in some countries, which are considered to be a tax paradise. OECD 
acted against some of these countries and it accused them from tax dumping, in 
recent years. 
3.1. The rationale for PIT 
The belief that the individual tax is the fairest of all taxes arises from the 
conviction that it accords best with the ability to pay. Net income is a measure of a 
person's capacity to command economic resources, and, intuitively, it seems to be a 
good indicator of ability to help finance government.9 
Over the course of 1970s, the PIT moved from being perceived as the most 
fair to the least fair in the United States10. This increasing dissatisfaction, which 
extended beyond the United States, was primarily due to the combination of an 
8 MESSERE (2003) 
9 GOODE (1976) 
10 SLEMROD (1996) 
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economic downturn and increasing inflation, with the consequence of higher 
income tax burdens when real incomes had almost ceased to grow. These 
spotlighted defects in income tax systems had been hidden during the previous 
fifteen years of strong economic growth. 
Fairness of progressive rates was nullified by expense-related tax reliefs, 
which enabled many types of taxpayers (businessmen, liberal professions, farmers) 
to reduce their income tax liabilities, so that the income tax burden was 
increasingly borne by employees. Governments and academics became aware that 
existing income tax systems might distort savings, investment, financing and 
production decisions.11 They became persuaded that these had negative effect on 
the level of household saving and on labour supply. Proliferation of tax reliefs, 
different treatment of various kinds of income, and too much rate bands (sometimes 
over thirty) had rendered the income systems of most industrialized countries 
extremely complex with correspondingly high compliance costs and loss of 
certainty. By the late 1970s there has been a growing consensus that the existing 
income tax systems infringe equity, efficiency and simplicity. Thus they have had 
a little rationale and it was essential that they should be either replaced or 
reformed. 
The view of the most policy makers was that the PIT should be replaced 
rather than reformed, between 1975 and 1985. During this period, proposals 
emerged from a number of public finance economists as well as tax reform 
commissions in Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States to 
replace or supplement the income tax by a progressive expenditure tax. The base of 
such a tax would be consumer expenditures, replaced by total income plus gifts and 
bequests received, minus savings made. A progressive rate schedule would be 
applied to this tax base. Under most proposals, such a tax would be supplemented 
by a cash flow corporate tax, which would replace the traditional corporate income 
tax (CIT) as well as a progressive tax on the capital of emigrants and the deceased. 
The competing arguments for a reformed income tax and a progressive expenditure 
tax were widely debated between the mid-1970s and the mid -1980s.12 
"AARON et al. (1988) 
12 CNOSSEN and BIRD (1990) 
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The intensity of the debate subsided once the United States in 1986, followed 
by most other industrial countries during the next five years, opted for reform of 
the income tax, rather than for its replacement. To put it differently, governments 
found, that a reformed income tax had a greater rationale than the only possible 
alternative to raising sufficient amounts of revenue. 
The question remained open, and still remains open, of how the income tax 
should be reformed to obtain the ideal maximization of equity, efficiency, and 
simplicity. The major thrust of the income tax reforms of the late 1980s, was that 
the then existing tax base was unnecessary narrow with respect to, for example, the 
treatment of capital gains, fringe benefits, social benefits and allowable deductions. 
When it will be combined with the rate lowering and reduction of the number of 
brackets of the rate schedule, a broader-based income tax would have greater 
justification in terms of horizontal equity, efficiency, and simplicity. On the other 
hand, during the 1990s, there has been a revival of the idea of moving towards 
a consumption base by eliminating some or all forms of saving from the income tax 
base on the ground that this would encourage aggregate household savings. Or it 
would reduce the present tax distortions between different forms of savings, some 
of which are tax privileged, while others are not. The recent lower flat rates applied 
to dividend and interest incomes (or their partial or full exclusion from the PIT 
base, in a number of countries) provide the most important practical examples of 
such base narrowing. 
Here, I mentioned only the first question of why a traditional income tax 
continues to be universally preferred, even though for practical and policy reasons 
there remain many consumption tax elements in the tax base. There still remains 
many second-order policy issues within the income tax systems, such as their 
relationship with social security contributions and the associated benefits, the 
choice between income tax reliefs and direct expenditures, the income treatment of 
the one and two-earner families relative to each other and to single persons. 
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3.2. History of Personal Income Taxation 
Personal income tax was for the first time introduced in the United Kingdom 
at the end of the eighteenth century to finance the Napoleonic wars. PIT became 
fairly widespread only towards the beginning of the twentieth century. Until the 
Second World War it remained a relatively unimportant tax in relation to revenues 
raised and numbers of the taxpayers covered. This is illustrated in the following 
table, which shows how the United States' federal tax evolved between 1913 and 
1975. These fluctuations were influenced by the war 1914-1918 and especially 
1939-1945 when what was a tax paid by few became a tax paid by most households. 
Tab. 1 United States federal income tax 
Share in total federal tax revenues 
1914-16 1917-20 1921-29 1930-40 1941-45 1946-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-75 
6,2 18,4 22,8 17,8 33,4 39,6 42,9 43,8 45 
Percentage of population covered 
1913 1918 1926 1939 1945 1950 1960 1970 
less than 1 7,7 4,2 5 74,2 58,9 73,1 80,8 
Source: Goode (1976) 
During the last half of the twentieth century the following broad revenue 
trends emerged in industrialized countries: 
1960-1975: Income tax ratios increased mainly through fiscal drag and the bracket 
creep effect was accentuated as rate schedules became more progressive. On the 
other hand number of expense-related tax allowances increased thus narrowing the 
tax base. 
1975-1990: Income tax ratios remained stable because fiscal drag was usually 
offset. 
1990-2000: A relatively heavy fall in the income tax ratio between 1990 and 1995 
(unweighted OECD average fell from 10,7 to 10,0) since when it has remained 
almost unchanged.13 
13 MESSERE (2003) 
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Fig. 1 Taxes on income and profits (1000) as percentage of GDP and total 
tax revenues (OECD average) 
45 
40 
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Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, 2005, own graph 
PIT revenue trends are illustrated by Fig. 2, which provides OECD average 
PIT revenues as a percentage of GDP and total tax revenues at five-yearly intervals 
between 1965 and 2000 and than for years 2002 and 2003. It should be noted that 
the data are not entirely comparable, because the earlier series exclude a number of 
low PIT countries and the later series include for the first time countries which 
joined OECD later. Also, as already mentioned above, the average OECD PIT share 
conceals great variety between OECD countries. Fig. 3, which reproduces the PIT 
ratio and share in 2003, indicates the great differences among the selected 
countries. 
21 
Fig. 2 Taxes on personal income (1100) as percentage of GDP and total tax 
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Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, 2005, own graph 
3.3. The Procedures of Personal Income Taxation 
The tax unit 
Countries vary according to whether or not they aggregate for PIT purposes 
the earned income of spouses, where both are gainfully employed. In the countries 
where joint taxation is used, tax liability is calculated by applying the appropriate 
rate schedule to the aggregated taxable (earned) incomes of the spouses. Under 
individual taxation, tax liability is calculated by applying the appropriate rate 
schedule to the taxable earned income of each spouse. 
Global and Schedular Tax Systems 
The OECD trend has been mostly to move away from schedular taxation 
under which each source of income is subject to a separate treatment of rate and 
base towards global taxation where all income from whatever source is aggregated 
and one rate schedule is applied. However, OECD tax systems have been only 
relatively global in that sense, that pension funds and capital gains are sometimes 
not taxed at all, different allowances may be given to the employed, self-employed, 
farmers, and the liberal professions and different schedule rates may apply to 
earned, investment and agricultural income. Moreover, in recent years certain 
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aspects of schedular taxation have been introduced in the North American and 
Nordic countries and the Netherlands. 
Tax reliefs 
Tax reliefs are provided in a variety of ways in the OECD Member countries. 
We may summarize the main distinction between types of relief as follows. 
Standard, and non-standard reliefs. These reliefs are unrelated to the actual 
expenditure incurred by the taxpayer and are available to all taxpayers that satisfy 
the eligibility rules. The tax threshold, under which no PIT is payable, is the one, 
which is the most important. There is usually this one threshold for all PIT payers 
and an additional one for those in employment. On the other hand, the non-standard 
reliefs, are reliefs which amounts are wholly determined by reference to the actual 
expenses incurred. 
There are very important differences between standard and non-standard 
reliefs. The former are usually considered as part of the tax schedule and as an 
alternative to increasing marginal rates for achieving progressivity. The later are 
generally regressive and entail a further narrowing of the tax base. These non-
standard reliefs are clearly tax expenditures, whereas it is arguable whether the 
same holds for the standard tax reliefs. 




• Share of GDP • Share of tax revenues 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, 2005, own graph 
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Forms of tax reliefs 
Own tax duty (tax amount) could be counted by the following procedure: 
• Taxable income is summed up 
• Standard and non-standard reliefs are enforced (subtracted) 
• Tax rate or formula for computing is applied on the arose tax base 
• Computed tax can be further lowered by the tax allowances 
This procedure is jointly exercised in all industrialized countries. On the 
other hand these steps are not uniformly interpreted. 
In the first step countries differ in that sense, which incomes they are 
including into the tax base and which not. If after the half year of holding shares, 
I sell these shares with the profit; in one country is this profit subject to taxation in 
other it is not. In the same direction, the legislation connected to the point three 
differs among particular states. Number and levels of tax rates differ. States are 
also having different approach to point two and four. Firstly, what is considered by 
one state as a relief does not have to be a relief in the other state. Secondly, there 
are distinctions among countries in which way they offer the relief. The two forms 
of tax relief most widely used are known as tax allowances (tax deductions in the 
United States) and tax credits. Under tax allowances, there is a lump sum deduction 
from income potentially subject to tax, thus arriving at taxable income or the base 
to which the rate schedule applies. Tax credits are lump sum deductions from the 
tax due to be paid.14 The important difference between tax allowances and tax 
credits is that the value of the former is a function of the marginal rate of the 
taxpayer. Thus, under progressive income tax schedules tax allowances are worth 
more to high than to low income taxpayers. Conversely, the value of tax credits is 
uneffected by the taxpayers" marginal rate of tax. 
Generally, it holds, that relief in the form of deductible item lowers tax base, 
effective tax credits can be different between the two taxpayers, who had applied 
the same deductible item. To express the overall tax credit among the individual 
taxpayers is quite difficult. This approach is at the same time less transparent than 
14 Though normally the lump sum deduction from income subject to tax (in the case of tax 
allowances) and from the tax due (in the case of tax credits) is unrelated to income, in a few 
countries it has been related, sometimes positively, sometimes negatively, to income. 
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provision of the tax relief, where tax credit is the same for all taxpayers. Since a lot 
of tax credits have social character, it is interesting to watch their working together 
with the social system. This table presents the way of exercising tax credits of 
social character and tax credits on child in some OECD countries. 
Tab. 2 System of tax allowances in chosen OECD countries 
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° there exists also constant tax allowance in Poland 
h Sweden has a more complicated construction of tax allowances, their level depends on the 
income 
Source: OECD (2001c) 
In most countries, family status is generally taken into account by the use of 
tax allowances or tax credits but reliefs in respect of family status may also take 
the form of: 
• Income-splitting systems (e.g. in Germany) 
• Family quotient systems (e.g. in France) 
• Separate schedules (e.g. in the United States). 
Under income-splitting systems, whatever is the actual income of the two 
spouses, it is considered (for tax purposes) to be equal so that the schedule rate is 
applied for each to half their total income. Under family-quotient systems, taxable 
income is divided by further amounts to take account of the existence of certain 
dependents, most importantly minor children. The separate schedules systems are 
applying different rate schedules to single and married persons. 
Collection procedures 
Late and inefficient tax collection combined with high inflation poses a 
major problem, in the third world and in the transitional economies. Less so in 
industrialized countries, where tax is normally charged by reference to the income 
of a particular year, which may be the calendar year or some other period of twelve 
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months. In some cases the tax is charged on the actual income received or accruing 
in the year, and in others, it may be charged on an amount calculated by reference 
to the income of the previous year. This process may vary not only from country to 
country but also, within the same country's tax system, from one source of income 
to another. The method of collecting of income tax affects, also, the amount of tax 
revenues, the speed of tax collection, the collection costs-to-yield ratio and the 
attitudes of taxpayers to the system. A lot of income tax revenues is provided by 
wage and salary earners, and in the OECD industrialized countries, other than 
France and Switzerland, tax is withheld along with social security contributions by 
the employers on income currently earned. Collection procedures appear to have an 
important effect on personal income tax revenues. For example, when Denmark in 
1970 and Italy in 1977 moved to withholding at source systems, PIT revenues 
substantially increased. The fact that until 1998 France had the lowest PIT ratio of 
all industrialized countries is almost certainly not unconnected with its collection 
procedures. 
There are also differences in the pay-as-you-earn systems. For example, 
under the British system there is cumulative withholding with no periodical 
adjustment. In most countries, there is an end-year adjustment to take account of 
tax underpaid, or overpaid. Also in some countries the tax authorities assess the 
taxpayers" liability whereas in others the taxpayer makes a self-assessment. 
3.3.1. The tax base 
There follow five specific areas where the tax base has been widened in 
recent years in a number of OECD countries. 
1. The favourable treatment of fringe benefits, defined as all advantages, other 
than monetary salary and wages, in consequence of services rendered, or to 
be rendered, by an employee,15 has resulted in a proliferation of this form of 
wage and salary payment. 
2. The deductibility of premiums for retirement and insurance schemes has 
provided a large conversion of current income into future income. 
3. The favourable treatment of imputed income from owner-occupied property 
is augmented by the favourable capital gains tax treatment accorded to sales 
15 (OECD 1988a) 
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of principal dwelling-places and sometimes to sales of two or more 
dwellings. 
4. The deductibility of interest related to consumer credit expenditure still 
prevalent in a few countries has the effects of a negative consumption tax 
and discourages saving. 
5. The frequent exemption from income tax of unemployment and other welfare 
payments could have work disincentive effects and seems unnecessary since 
such benefits could be grossed up to whatever level considered appropriate 
and taxed like other sources of income. 
In their different ways, all five of these expenses-related tax concessions 
may distort consumer choices, discriminate against certain taxpayers and lead to a 
non-optimal allocation of resources. All except the last also reduce the 
progressivity of the personal income tax. There are good grounds for abolishing or 
reducing these concessions, as has been done in many countries during the last 
fifteen years, through political resistance to such base widening has remained 
strong. 
The Relative Importance of Standard and Non-standard Tax Allowances 
The most of decreases of a comprehensive PIT base are due to tax 
allowances. The main examples of non-standard allowances are: 
1. Deductibility of mortgage interest payments combined with a preferential 
treatment of imputed rent 
2. Deductibility of contributions to private pension schemes and a favourable 
treatment of the income of the pension fund and/or the pension payment. 
3. Deductibility of premiums on life insurance policies combined with a partial 
exemption of the proceeds. 
4. Exemption of interest payments received on national savings arrangements, 
post office savings, and bank deposits. 
5. Tax exemption of interest received on government bonds. 
6. Tax exemption or reduction of income from small investments in equities. 
7. Tax incentives for private investments in equities to provide capital for 
productive investment. 
8. Tax incentives for the purchase of employee participation shares. 
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9. Tax incentives for starting up or expanding a business.16 
The range for widening the tax base by reducing or abolishing non-standard 
tax allowances varied considerably from country to country. Data in OECD (1990a) 
show that at the time these expense-related tax allowances varied from 22 per cent 
of income subject to tax in Denmark to 2 per cent in Spain. Mortgage interest relief 
usually represented the most important of these tax expenditures, being as a 
percentage of income subject to tax nearly 14 per cent in Norway, over 10 per cent 
in Denmark and between 4 and 6 per cent in the Netherlands, Sweden, United 
Kingdom and United States. Since then interest relief has been reduced or abolished 
in a number of countries. It all indicates the various possibilities governments have 
had at their disposal for widening the tax base. 
OECD also provids quantitative data on tax allowances. Most important is 
the basic allowance available to all taxpayers. It amounted to over 30 per cent of 
income subject to tax in Canada and over 20 per cent in France, and the United 
Kingdom, though less than 10 per cent in Germany and Spain.17 
The classification into standard and non-standard allowance is somewhat 
arbitrary with regard to work related expenses and social security contributions, 
both of which tend also to be quite important. Tab. 3 gives aggregate figures as a 
percentage of income subject to tax according to the classification that was 
provided by these countries. 
16 MESSERE 2003 p.76 
17 Data OECD (1990a) 
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Tab. 3 Standard and non-standard tax allowances as a share of PIT revenues 
Country Tax allowances as percentage of PIT 
revenues 
Standard + N o f " , Total standard 
Australia 0 10,3 10,3 
Canada 20,8 7,1 28 
France 29,3 0,1 29,5 
Germany 7,1 17,6 24,7 
Italy 0 5 5 
Spain 5,1 2,1 7,2 
Sweden 13,3 12,4 25,7 
United Kingdom 34,5 9 43,5 
United States 26,3 14,5 40,8 
Source: OECD (1990a) 
3.3.2. Tax schedule 
There was a one way move in both OECD and non-OECD countries from 
what were unambiguously schedular systems18 towards ambiguous global systems19, 
until the mid-1980s. Since mid-1980s there has been a return in certain ways to 
schedular type taxation in North American and Nordic countries in two different 
respects; first, alternative minimum, or supplementary gross income taxes and 
second, dual income taxes, which are generally referred to as Dual income tax 
(DIT)20. In addition, another example of schedular taxation is provided by 
presumptive taxation of capital income in the Netherlands. 
There are signs that quasi-schedular taxes will continue in the form of low 
flat rates (or even zero rates in some countries) on capital income, but probably not 
in the form of a pure dual income tax. Alternative minimum taxes and 
supplementary taxes on gross income have been much criticized and have not 
spread to other countries. 
18 Each source of income is subject to different rates of tax. 
19 Differentiation according to different income sources is limited, if sometimes not all that 
limited. 
20 Dual income tax. A system under which capital income is taxed at the same flat rate as 
corporate income and at (around) the lowest marginal rate applied to labour income. 
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Alternative Minimum and Supplementary Gross Income Taxes 
In the 1986 the United States put into practice Tax Reform Act. This Act 
introduced an alternative minimum tax under which higher income taxpayers were 
obliged to pay whichever is the greater of 21 per cent of their gross income or the 
normal rate schedule applied to their taxable income. Similar provisions exist in 
Canada. In the past, Norway has adopted a supplementary tax on gross income that 
is payable only by those with higher incomes. 
Alternative minimum taxes or supplementary gross income taxes may be 
introduced for a variety of reasons, such as: 
• To avoid having to make a distinction between deductible interest for 
business expenses and non-deductible (or limited deductible) expenses for 
interest for house purchase or consumer credit. The taxpayer may find it easy 
to camouflage it as a business expense 
• To reduce the tax advantage of borrowing compared with savings. 
• To prevent arbitrage through taking out of loans with the main purpose of 
obtaining deduction of interest on such loans from income subject to tax 
• To ensure high income groups pay a reasonable amount of tax and to counter 
tax avoidance. 
Such provisions complicate the tax system and on the tax policy agenda are 
the relative advantages and disadvantages of the alternative approach of achieving 
similar objectives by further limiting the deductibility of interest payments from 
income subject to tax. In practice, the politicians seem to be less resistant to 
imposing such complicated schemes as alternative minimum or supplementary 
gross taxes, than to cutting back on interest deductibility. 
Dual Income Taxes 
Dual income taxes have been pioneered in the Nordic countries. Their 
objective is to ensure tax neutrality between different sources of finance and 
towards the taxation of retained and distributed profits and towards corporations 
and unincorporated firms. 
Under a pure dual income tax a capital income is taxed at the same flat rate 
as corporate income and at (around) the lowest marginal rate applied to earned 
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income. A pure DIT exists only in Norway; Sweden has a modified dual income 
tax. The advantages and defects of dual income tax are currently a live topic of 
debate. 
The virtues consist in achieving such a balance, so that business decisions 
are not affected by the necessity of taking discriminatory taxation into account, and 
applying a comparatively low tax rate on personal savings so that they are 
discouraged from moving abroad to lower taxation. 
The defects are of four kinds. 
• It may be politically unacceptable to tax capital income at lower rate than 
earned income. For this reason Denmark virtually abandoned dual income 
tax and Sweden has a modified DIT. 
• The distinction between capital and earned income is not always clear and 
the differential rates have been exploited for tax planning purposes. 
• Close controlled unincorporated enterprises with large profits can take 
advantage of DIT to obtain a much lower PIT rate. 
• Dual income tax systems typically have liberal rules allowing deduction of 
interest payments on personal debts. These can cause substantial revenue 
losses if taxpayers are able to borrow money to invest in tax-sheltered 
investments. 
Presumptive Taxation of Capital Income 
As a consequence of increasing cross-border capital mobility, there has been 
a prospect of leakage of tax revenues. Governments^ reactions in different countries 
have varied according to this matter. The Netherlands introduced a tax reform in 
2001 under which nearly all capital income actually earned (interest, dividend and 
rents) is totally exempt from PIT. Profits from unincorporated enterprises, labour 
income, imputed rent of home owners, pension income, and social benefits remain 
taxed at progressive rates. To avoid double taxation, net wealth invested in 
unincorporated enterprises and the first home is excluded from the taxable base of 
the presumptive income tax on net wealth. 
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The Tax Threshold 
The tax threshold (the level of earnings at which income tax is first paid) is 
an important tax policy issue from a number of perspectives. First, it determines 
progressivity of an income tax system. Second, the size of the tax threshold may 
influence the point at which the poverty trap becomes operative. Third, the tax 
threshold will have an impact on the revenue yield from the PIT and increasing the 
threshold is generally costly in terms of revenue foregone. 
One opinion about the income tax threshold is that, those around subsistence 
level should be not expected to pay income tax. This approach is adopted by France 
and Norway. At the other extreme is the view that for reasons of accountability or 
solidarity nearly all citizens should be expected to pay tax, even if at the lower end 
of the income scale the taxpayer may be a net beneficiary of the tax transfer system 
(e.g. Denmark, Sweden). In favour of high thresholds, it can also be argued that 
they reduce the poverty and unemployment traps. A main argument against this 
thresholds is the important amount of revenue thereby foregone, which may require 
what on other grounds may be seen as excessively progressive rate schedules and 
the introduction of an unprogressive PIT on gross income. 
It would be misleading to look at particular countries" income tax thresholds 
without regard to their thresholds for social security contributions and even more 
misleading for the purposes of international comparisons. 
3.3.3. Taxes on Labour 
In the present context, we will consider both PIT and social security 
contributions to be taxes on labour. The employee's contribution is evidently a 
burden on the worker, unless the levy is shifted on to employers insofar as 
compensating wage demands are met. Employers" contributions may seem less 
evidently a tax on labour, but it is generally believed that over time both employee 
and employer contributions are shifted on to workers in the form of lower wages or, 
probably to a lesser extent, of higher consumer prices. A very different picture of 
workers" tax burdens emerges, when social security contributions are taken into 
account. Because of the following differences from PIT, contributions are typically 
an unprogressive form of taxation: 
• No account is taken of family circumstances, 
• a tax base nearer to gross wages than taxable income, 
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• unprogressive rates and a ceiling above which contributions are not payable, 
and, 
• a very low tax threshold or even none at all. 
High PIT revenues are in most countries accompanied by low social security 
contributions and conversely. The countries, where PIT predominates, are for 
example Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Contributions 
outweigh PIT in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain. 
Australia imposes no social security contributions. 
Tab. 4 shows how the tax situation changes in different family 
circumstances, when different factors are included in the concept of taxation. 
Focusing on the tax system of ten OECD countries, the table shows average 
effective tax rates and the tax wedge, for eight family types, characterized by 
different family status, economic status and wage level. Wage levels represent 33, 
67, 100 and 167 per cent of annual gross wage earnings of an average production 
worker (APW) in each of these countries. In the Tab. 4, is shown average effective 
rate of PIT (personal income tax due as a percentage of gross wage earnings). This 
underlines how progressive PIT generally is. It takes a higher share from families 
with higher incomes and makes allowances for children and single parents. For 
single workers without children at the wage level of APW (column 2) the average 
PIT rate varies between 6 per cent (Japan) and 26 per cent (Sweden). In most 
OECD countries, at the APW wage level, the average PIT rate of single persons is 
substantially higher than that faced by one-earner married couples with two young 
children ( compare columns 2 and 5 of the Tab. 4). There are two exceptions here, 
Australia and Sweden. They impose the same rate of tax on one earner married 
couples and single persons if wages are the same. For the comparison, to see, how 
the effective tax rate of PIT changed between 2000 and 2004, we may observe data 
in the last two rows. We see that no radical changes occurred since 2004. 
In Germany, United Kingdom and the United States, lone parents with two 
children at 67 per cent of APW wage receive a transfer payment through the PIT 
system which exceeds the amount of income tax due. Such non-wastable tax credits 
explain why column 4 of Tab. 4 shows a negative tax burden in these cases. In 
Germany, on balance even married workers with two children are entitled to a small 
payment from the government. A comparison of columns 5 and 6 in Tab. 4 
demonstrates that if the spouse finds a job which pays her one-third of the APW 
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wage, the PIT rate of the family will slightly increase in Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands, Spain and the United States. On the other hand, the PIT burden is not 
affected in France and the United Kingdom, and it falls in Australia, Italy and 
Sweden. 
Tab. 4 Effective rate of personal income tax, 200021 
Family type 
Status a S S S S M M M M sc M c 
Number of children 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 
Wage levelb 0,67 1 1,67 0,67 1+0 1+0,33 1+0,67 1+0,33 1 1+0 
Country 
Australia 18 23 30 17 23 19 21 19 24 24 
France 9 13 18 8 8 8 9 10 13 7 
Germany 15 21 30 -6 -1 7 12 15 20 -3 
Italy 15 19 25 9 15 14 16 15 19 12 
Japan 5 6 10 2 2 4 4 5 6 3 
Netherlands 5 8 22 2 5 6 7 6 9 8 
Spain 6 12 17 0 3 7 7 9 13 4 
Sweden 24 26 34 24 26 25 25 25 24 24 
United Kingdom 13 16 18 -10 13 13 15 13 16 8 
United States 
a • . . 
16 18 24 -6 8 11 13 16 17 2 
a S = single, M = married couple 
Wage levels are in multiples of the average production worker's (APW) wage 
c Data (2004), 
Source: OECD (2005) 
Tab. 5 shows the effect of adding employees" social security contributions, 
where the progressivity of PIT is reduced. First, average rates for Australia in Tab. 
4 and Tab. 5 are the same, because Australia does not levy social security 
contributions. 
For single workers without children at the wage level of an APW, the 
combined average rate of PIT plus employee contributions varies between 16 per 
cent (Japan) and 42 per cent (Germany). See column 2 of the table. Social security 
contributions are usually levied at the flat rate without any exempt threshold. In a 
number of countries ceiling applies. However, it usually comes into force at 
earnings levels exceeding 167 per cent of the APW wage. This particular rate 
21 as percentage of gross wage 
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structure is reflected in almost constant average contributions rate over the whole 
range of 33 per cent to 167 per cent of wage earnings. The combined PIT and 
contributions rate of single persons and married couples (in percentage points) is 
more or less similar to the margin between their average PIT rates. 
We should next consider, the combined burden of PIT and employee social 
security contributions, but with levies due reduced by the amount of universal cash 
benefits that each family type is entitled to. Such transfers generally help families 
with children and lone partners, especially when they are on low incomes. Thus, 
figures, which present average rates of taxpayers without children, would be 
identical. Furthermore, Germany, Japan, Spain and the United States do not use 
universal cash transfers outside the tax system to provide financial assistance to 
parents, so their tax rates would be also identical with those in Tab. 5. In the 
countries that do use cash benefits, such transfers payments reduce the PIT plus 
contribution rate for average production workers by 6 points (France and 
Netherlands) to 9 percentage points (Australia, Italy and Sweden).22 
We may also add employers" social security contributions to obtain an 
overall picture of the effect of the tax system and family benefits. Total levies due 
minus transfers received can be expressed as a percentage of total labour costs, 
which is gross wage plus employers" social security contributions. The latter are 
sometimes called non-wage labour costs. The gap between total labour costs and 
net take-home pay is also known as the wedge. 
Many countries with high rate of PIT plus employee contributions tend to 
levy employers" contributions at relatively low rates, and conversely. In the case of 
the single worker at the APW wage level the wedge ranges from 23 to 24 percent of 
labour costs (Australia and Japan) to 50-52 per cent (Germany and Sweden).23 
22 Data OECD: (2002b) 
23 Data OECD: (2002b) 
35 
Tab. 5 Effective rate of employee taxes, 200024 
Family type 
Statusa S S S S M M M M 
Number of children 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 
Wage level b 0,67 1 1,67 0,67 1+0 1+0,33 1+0,67 1+0,33 
Country 
Australia 18 23 30 17 23 19 21 19 
France 22 27 31 21 21 21 23 23 
Germany 36 42 49 15 20 27 33 36 
Italy 24 29 34 18 24 23 25 24 
Japan 15 16 20 12 12 14 14 15 
Netherlands 31 36 39 20 31 32 34 32 
Spain 12 18 23 6 9 14 14 15 
Sweden 31 33 39 31 33 32 32 32 
United Kingdom 19 24 26 -3 21 19 22 19 
United States 24 26 32 2 15 19 21 24 
a S = single, M = married couple 
b Wage levels are in multiples of the average production worker's (APW) wage. 
Source: OECD (2002b) 
3.4. Family taxation 
A basic question in any income tax system is what should be the relative 
treatment of taxpayers in different working and family situations. There is a 
distinction between ends and means. Governments have varying conflicting ends 
such as to remain neutral or to encourage couples to get married, to influence their 
single or joint participation in the labour force, to determine what would be the 
most equitable, economically efficient and popular distribution of the tax burden 
between single persons, one-earner married couples and two-earner married 
couples. Neutrality towards these decisions at one income level may cause non-
neutrality at other income levels. To achieve the preferred differentiation, 
governments have a variety of their means, e.g.: earned income of couples may be 
aggregated for tax purposes or each member of the couple may be taxed separately; 
reliefs may be progressive. The discussion related to means of instruments focused 
mostly on the choice of tax unit that has changed in most OECD countries over the 
24 as percentage of gross wage 
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last three decades from compulsory joint or family aggregation of income to 
separate taxation of couples or the option of separate taxation. 
Choice of tax unit has relatively little importance for the relative tax burdens 
of different categories of taxpayers. In general, separate taxation favours high 
income two-earner couples and penalizes low-income two-earner couples. On other 
hand the rate schedule and the relief structure play a more important part in such 
determination. Choice of tax unit may have a relatively small influence on relative 
tax bills of different categories of taxpayers. However, it has a great deal of social 
significance in other respects. For instance, aggregated taxation is incompatible 
with the privacy of each spouse.25 
It is up to the governments to decide what should be the relationship between 
the taxes paid by single and married taxpayers with the same level of pre-tax 
income. Today, it becomes increasingly accepted that men and women have a right 
to be considered as independent persons vis-a-vis the fiscal authorities and from 
other legal and socioeconomic points of view as well. Therefore, individuals should 
not be forced to adopt any particular attitude towards their habits of earning and 
spending even if, in practice, they may approach to them in the same way. 
There is a view that married couples enjoy certain advantages in spending 
their income compared with single persons and newer approach that sees a need for 
marriage to be fiscally neutral in the sense that two earners pay more tax after 
marriage than before, or than two single partners with the same combined income. 
The comparison of taxes paid by single persons and married couples is closely 
related to the further question. What should be the tax paid by two single persons in 
gainful employment, if they marry and continue to work? If before and after 
marriage, there is no tax advantage or disadvantage between the positions of the 
two taxpayers, in this sense, the tax system is neutral. Such neutrality can be seen 
as desirable to avoid different influencing attitudes towards marriage and divorce. 
On the other hand, it may be considered desirable to make it more advantageous to 
marry from the tax point of view.26 A reduction in the tax progressivity of the 
income tax system may be required to fulfill the objective of tax neutrality with 
respect to marriage. Especially in such case, when tax progressivity produces an 
25 in practice almost always the wife 
26 no matter if one income earner or two are concerned 
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unequal treatment of taxpayers in different personal circumstances, but with the 
same income. It may be difficult simultaneously to achieve tax neutrality with 
regard to the decision to marry of two single persons, only one of whom is working, 
and of two persons, both in employment and who wish to continue working after 
marriage. Another problem is that a progressive income tax paid by a couple cannot 
satisfy the two criteria. First, that the income tax paid by a couple should be based 
on total income, regardless of how much each contributes. Second, that the total 
amount of tax paid by two persons should not change in the event of their getting 
married or divorced. 
Taxation is believed to reduce labour supply of working wives more than 
other categories of taxpayers. There is not a general opinion as to what would 
constitute equal tax treatment for working wives. Many considerations in this sense 
are relevant, such as: the notions of discretionary income and of economies of scale 
when two people live together, of additional expenses associated with working, of 
the imputed income of wives who do not work outside the home, and so on. We 
may compare tax/benefit situation of working wives to her husband's situation, the 
single gainfully employed women, or of a wife not in the labour force. Relative tax 
treatment of a working wife compared to other categories will vary not only 
according to income level but also to whether her choice is to enter the labour 
force, remain in the labour force after marriage, work overtime or re-enter the 
labour force. The tax treatment of her additional costs, especially of child care, will 
be a main factor. 
State subsidized child-care facilities or cash transfers to mothers reduce such 
expenses in many countries. Since most governments allow taxpayers to deduct 
from income subject to tax unavoidable costs directly incurred in earning income, it 
could be argued that child care expenses are an unavoidable cost of working for 
married women with children. On the other hand, it has been argued that such costs 
are also incurred by the wife who stays at home, where there take the form of an 
opportunity cost which is expressed in terms of a loss of leisure rather than an 
explicit money payment. The question is whether or not should the income tax 
system take account of the cost of bringing up children, and whether any such relief 
should apply equally to one and two-earner families. 
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According to Messere (2003) there are four normative positions towards the 
relationship between the tax/benefit system and the treatment of parents. 
Nowadays, first two of them are of less importance: 
1. The Elitist Approach 
This approach says that government should encourage the rich to procreate 
since the cost to society is less than costs of rearing the children by this family. 
2. The Children as a Consumption Good Approach 
This view considers children to be a form of consumption good, which couples 
choose to derive pleasure from. In OECD countries, where the means to avoid 
reproduction have been widely available, there is no reason for preferential 
treatment for parents unless governments wish to encourage this form of 
consumption. 
The following two approaches are more important: 
3.4.1. The Taxable Capacity Approach 
The taxable capacity approach emphasizes the need to maintain horizontal 
equity under income tax systems27 and we may summarize it as follows. Under 
income tax systems based on the principle of ability to pay28, the taxable capacity 
of parents is considered to be lower than that of childless couples. It is so because 
of the additional expenditure needs connected with having children. The advocates 
of this approach argue that tax allowances are worth more to taxpayers with higher 
incomes than to taxpayers with lower incomes. And that it is merely due to the 
progressivity of tax systems. 
According to this approach, what is relevant, is the appropriate 
differentiation between taxpayers having different sized families at given income 
levels. And the issue is not one of how taxpayers at different income levels should 
be treated. Proponents of the taxable capacity approach are concerned with the 
logic of a progressive income tax system based on the ability-to-pay principle. 
27 It is closely discussed by Musgrave (1959) and defended, for example, by Brennan and Morss 
(1973) 
The widely held view that the amount of taxes someone pays should increase as their income 
increases. 
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They accept the need for cash transfers to parents with below subsistence income, 
but argue that this should not be done through the income tax system. 
3.4.2. The Social Welfare Approach 
The social welfare approach is more connected with alleviation of poverty. 
Poverty tends to be positively correlated with the number of children, rather than 
with horizontal equity. Its proponents consider that the main rationale for 
subsidizing parents is their need for such aid. Under this approach there is no place 
for tax allowances which benefit rich parents more than poor29. Under such an 
approach the appropriate method of aiding parents is either by cash transfers or by 
non-wastable tax credits30. 
Supporters of the taxable capacity approach refer that if the fixed amount 
were equal to that needed to support a child of a taxpayer in the lowest income 
bracket; its value (being equal to that amount multiplied by the lowest marginal 
rate of tax31) would be insufficient to compensate a higher-income parent. This 
parent would require relief equal to the subsistence costs multiplied by his marginal 
rate of tax. And vice versa, if the tax credit were sufficient to free the highest rate 
taxpayers from tax on the subsistence costs of their children, the reduction in tax 
liability would be too great for low-income parents. In other words, to provide a tax 
credit of the lower amount would, under the taxable capacity approach, be held to 
penalize rich parents unduly in relation to rich childless couples. And to grant a tax 
credit of the higher amount would be held to favour poor parents unduly in relation 
to poor childless couples. 
29 or even wastable tax credits which are of no use to people, whose income is below the income 
tax threshold 
30 Refundable or non-wastable tax credits can reduce the tax owed below zero. It can result in a 
net payment to the taxpayer beyond their own payments into the tax system. It appears to be a 
moderate form of negative income tax. Examples: the earned income tax credit and the additional 
child tax credit in the US, and the working tax credits or child tax credits in the UK. 
The marginal tax rate refers to the increase in one's tax obligation as one's taxable income rises: 
marginal tax rate = A(tax obligation)/A(taxable income) 
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Supporters of the social welfare approach also oppose tax credits; that they 
are not going far enough to meet their objectives. Except for the fact that tax 
credits for parents which exceed tax liabilities are frequently wastable, credits are 
received usually by the father and cash transfers usually by the mother32. Also, cash 
transfers are in some countries taxable which meets progressivity objectives. 
On a taxable capacity approach, it may be seen as perfectly normal that tax 
allowances exist side-by-side with cash transfers, and many governments operate 
aid to parents simultaneously through the two systems. However, a number of 
governments over the last twenty years have decided to aid parents exclusively 
outside the tax system. 
Government choices on how to aid parents may be in practice more 
influenced by other considerations (practical and pragmatic) than by the 
philosophical attitudes. Three of these considerations are: 
1. The general advantages and disadvantages influencing the choice between 
tax expenditures and direct expenditures concerning transparency, effects on 
total tax ratios, and so on. 
2. The fact that usually, the father benefits most or entirely from tax reliefs and 
the mother from cash transfers. A move from tax reliefs to cash transfers will 
usually reduce the take-home pay of the husband. Although the disposable 
income of the family may be more or less unchanged. This move may lead to 
an increase in wage demands of the husband to compensate for the heavier 
tax burden (tax-push inflation). Conversely, a move from cash transfers to 
tax reliefs may be resisted by the wife without paid employment.33 
3. Administrative convenience. It would seem that some countries have found 
tax reliefs, others cash transfers more convenient (and certain countries have 
changed their minds over the years). 
3.5. Taxes on Labour and Work Supply 
There are two main issues. First, at lower income levels the combination of 
income tax, social security contributions, and income-related benefits can create 
32 who needs them most 
33 Family allowances may be the only source of income over which she has control. 
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unemployment and poverty traps which discourage taxpayers from working more or 
even taking employment. The second is that tax may have a negative effect on the 
labour supply of married women. Many reforms to tax systems take as their 
objective to reduce such disincentives. 
We may all agree that different types of taxpayers34 are likely to respond in 
different ways to tax changes. This is not only a question of hours worked, but 
includes readiness to change work location, age of retirement and the form work 
takes, especially participation in the underground economy. Finally, a number of 
changes in income tax provisions, which were taken primarily for other reasons 
(such as horizontal equity or sex equality), could have effects on work supply. 
Taxation is not the only (and probably not the most important) factor 
affecting work supply. There are more such factors effecting labour supply of 
people in different (family, economical, different age, etc.) status. As one example 
it can serve the following. The decisions of married women to enter the labour 
force are probably influenced more by the availability of cheap child-care facilities 
and cultural attitudes than provisions in the tax legislation. In spite of it, 
governments have attributed many tax changes over the last three decades to a wish 
to improve work incentives. 
It could be helpful to look separately at the decisions that workers take over 
their hours from the decision whether or not to work. The effect of PIT on hours of 
work can be divided into the effect of the marginal tax rate on the substitution of 
leisure for work (the substitution effect) and the effect of the average tax rate in 
inducing more work to compensate for lost income (the income effect). Thus, any 
attempt to reduce the poverty trap35 should involve the reduction in the marginal tax 
rate and/or an increase in the average tax rate. The emphasis has been on reducing 
marginal tax rates, because any attempt to increase the average tax rate at low-
income levels is likely to worsen poverty. 
34 the rich and poor, young workers and the elderly, primary and secondary earners of a family, 
part-time and full-time workers and overtime earners 
The welfare trap is a name for a situation in which taxation and welfare systems create strong 
incentives for people to stay on social welfare payments. This is also known as the unemployment 
trap or poverty trap in the UK. 
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A similar analysis can be applied to the work supply of married women. A 
number of countries have moved towards separate taxation of husband and wife 
(mainly in the interests of sex equality). However, advocates36 of these changes 
have also argued that separate taxation allows married women to have their own tax 
schedule. Therefore, they usually face lower marginal tax rates than if they were 
taxed at their husbands" marginal rates under joint taxation. The loss of marriage 
relief that has often accompanied moves to separate taxation may entail a greater 
tax bill for low-paid two-earner couples than was previously the case under joint 
taxation. Taxation may produce a substitution effect that encourages married 
women's labour supply. Nevertheless, the income effect should not be neglected, 
and this depends on the exact way in which separate taxation has been introduced. 
If it has been designed to leave the average married couple paying the same amount 
of tax as before, a significant income effect is unlikely. On the other hand, if it 
were designed to reduce the taxation of married couples (eliminating the marriage 
penalty) the income effect could discourage married women's labour supply, and 
leave the overall effect uncertain. 
We may also analyze the decision whether to work at all, in terms of the 
income and substitution effects. In this case, the substitution effect does not depend 
on the marginal tax rate but the average tax rate (including loss of social benefits) 
that would apply to the earned income. This distinction is important in a number of 
countries that have introduced tax provisions, usually in the form of non-wastable 
tax credits, to encourage participation in work. These tax credits are available to 
low income workers but they are withdrawn gradually with an increase in income. 
These provisions reduce the average tax rate on earned income so they encourage 
participation in work. But they also increase the marginal tax rate over the income 
range where the credits are withdrawn. This second effect (combined with the 
income effect of receiving the tax credit) reduces the hours of work of those 
workers who were already working and earning an income in the withdrawal range. 
Net effect on work supply of these tax credits depends on whether the work 
performed by people who join the labour force outweighs the reduced work of those 
already in the labour force. Because of this uncertain outcome, several governments 
regard the reduction of dependency that is involved in moving people into work as 
36 see, for example Apps, P. (1991) or Florence Jaumotte (2003) 
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an important social goal. This goal outweighs the possible reduction in hours of 
people who are already independent of the benefit system. 
It is impossible to predict, a priori, in what circumstances the income effect 
will prevail over the substitution effect, and conversely. 
There are some opinions, that lower taxes on labour increase the employment 
of primary earners, and others advocate the contrary view.37 There now seems to be 
a consensus that tax/benefit incentives targeted at secondary earners are likely to 
increase their work supply if already in employment (or to seek employment in the 
formal economy, if unemployed). The predominance of the income effect over the 
substitution effect for secondary earners seems to apply irrespective of their income 
levels. 
The effect of taxation on the work supply of high-income groups has 
attracted relatively little attention among those interested in tax policy. The heavy 
reduction in top PIT rates was not so much due to the adverse effect on work effort. 
It was a measure to prevent transfers of income to tax haven countries. Possibly 
also, Governments have also understood that high tax rates might inhibit risk-
taking and innovation. Thus they might have a negative affect on the quality of 
labour supply. It is generally believed that the brain drain from Europe to the 
United States is due to differences in gross salaries (and greater research 
opportunities) and not to tax differentials. On the other hand, highly paid artists 
and athletes often use the option to reside in a so called tax heaven. 
4. Tax Choices of OECD Countries 
This chapter aims at identifying similarities and differences between the 
main choices of the OECD countries, with regard to tax levels, structures and 
systems-in many cases over the last forty or fifty years38. The chapter also tries to 
pick up some choices made by particular countries, not to be found elsewhere. 
To cover nineteen countries in about as many pages can produce only a very 
superficial view of their tax system as a whole. Omitted from the thirty OECD 
37 those are mostly the countries with the high PIT and social security contributions 
for rather shorter periods for the newly joined members of OECD in the transitional economies 
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countries, are eleven countries (Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Iceland, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico Switzerland and Turkey).39 Some of them 
have much in common with the Northern Europe group, with the economies in 
transition, with the central European group, and with USA, Canada and Japan. 
It is rational to divide this survey largely by geographical regions. Between 
most of Europe and industrialized OECD non-Europe there has been a wide 
difference of the role of government, which has accelerated over the last three 
decades. European countries40 have been much closer to the question of welfare 
state and this is shown most clearly in differences in their total tax ratios. Fifty 
years ago there was some correlation between total tax revenues (TTRs) levels and 
GDP per capita. This is now far from the case, when relatively poor countries like 
Greece and Portugal have a higher TTR than Japan and the United States. Another 
major difference between OECD Europe and industrialized OECD non-Europe is 
the tax structure. Consumption taxes and social security contributions are much 
more important for the most part of the Europe. To a much greater extent, non-
Europe relies on different revenue sources, personal income taxes (PITs) and taxes 
on real estate. Of course there are many exceptions, and the OECD developing 
countries (Mexico and Turkey), rely mostly on consumption taxes. 
There is also a rationale for treating OECD Europe and industrialized OECD 
nonEurope by geographical regions. Tax choices of Canada are influenced by those 
made in the United States. Within Europe there should be major convergences in 
tax choices between the Protestant countries of the north and the Catholic countries 
of the south. The tax systems of Austria and Germany and Ireland and the United 
Kingdom with their common language and history also have much in common, as 
have the OECD ex-communist countries. Neighboring countries frequently (but it is 
not a rule), take different tax policy decisions. 
More space is given to some countries or groups of countries than others. 
This reflects their activity in tax reform rather than their economic importance. The 
survey begins with four relatively small Northern European countries. This is 
because: 
39 however some of them are briefly mentioned in other subchapters 
24 except Ireland and Switzerland 
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. various tax reform commissions in these countries have contributed greatly 
to the analysis of all current tax policy issues; 
. in these four countries, tax reforms have been implemented more frequently 
and successfully than almost anywhere else; 
• many of these reforms are typical of those in other countries; 
• they illustrate most clearly the main finding of this survey: that neighbouring 
countries with similar outlooks may still take different tax policy decisions. 
4.1. Europe 
4.1.1. Four Northern European Countries 
Tab. 6 compares the tax levels of the four countries from 1955 to 2000, in 
relation to an OECD average. We may see their ranking compared to other OECD 
countries, in the brackets. 
This table shows that it is only between 1975 and 1990 that all four countries 
have generally had the highest TTRs among OECD countries. Sweden has been on 
the first place for most years since 1965, as a result of a large increase in its total 
tax revenues between 1955 and 1965, and sustained until the end of the century, 
and Denmark has held second place since 1985. 
Tab. 6 Total tax ratios in four Northern European countries41 
Country 1955 1965 1975 1985 1990 2000 
Denmark 23 (12) 30(9) 41(4) 49(2) 47(2) 49(2) 
Netherlands 27(8) 33(4) 43(2) 44(5) 43(4) 41 (9) 
Norway 28(5) 30(10) 40(5) 43(6) 42(7) 40 (10) 
Sweden 25(9) 35(1) 43 (1) 50(1) 56(1) 54(1) 
OECD average 25 26 31 34 36 37 
The figures in brackets represent the ranking order of the four countries among 
OECD countries (according to data availability and the increasing membership of 
OECD). 
Source: OECD (1981, 2002a). 
In Norway there has been little change in the TTR since 1975. The TTRs in 
1975 and 2000 are almost identical although many fluctuations over this period. 
The tax increases between 1955 and 1975 took very different forms in the 
four countries. In Denmark, we may see, between 1965 and 1971, the increase in 
41 as a percentage of GDP 
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TTR from 30 to 41 per cent. It is accounted for almost entirely by increases in the 
PIT, due to a change in the method of collecting the tax and not adjusting the tax 
schedule for inflation. Norway's TTR increase in the 1970s from 35 to 41 per cent 
came from a mixture of corporate income tax (CIT) and value-added tax (VAT). 
Most important for Norway's TTR was the discovery of North Sea oil which 
between 1975 and 1985 increased the CIT ratio from 1 to over 7 per cent of GDP 
while as a percentage of total tax receipts, CIT revenues increased from 3 to 17 per 
cent over the same period42. 
The Swedish route to increased taxation was through payroll taxes on 
employers, both earmarked for social security contributions and unearmarked. 
Increases in other revenue sources in Sweden have been relatively slight. Like 
Sweden, the increase in the Netherlands' TTR between 1965 and 1985 was almost 
entirely due to an increase in revenues from social security contributions, but 
unlike Sweden there were no unearmarked payroll taxes and again unlike Sweden 
contributions from employees as well as employers increased. 
Tax structures 
Tab. 7 shows the tax structures of the four Northern European countries. It 
indicates the ratios of the most important taxes to TTR for selected years and 
compared to an OECD average. 
There is shown in Tab. 7, that the four countries collect the bulk of their 
revenues in very different ways. Denmark with its very low reliance on social 
security contributions and extreme reliance on the personal income tax departs most 
from an OECD average. Norway relies most on consumption taxes and least on PIT 
and with Sweden it is the reverse. The Netherlands relies mostly on social security 
taxes, especially on employees. In all four countries most employees' contributions 
are levied on an income tax rather than gross wages base. 
42 Messere (2003) 
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P IT revenues CIT revenues 
1965 1980 2000 1965 1980 2000 1965 1980 2000 
Denmark 41 52 53 5 3 5 5 2 5 
Netherlands 28 26 15 8 13 10 31 38 39 
Norway 40 28 26 4 13 15 21 22 23 
Sweden 49 41 36 6 3 8 12 29 28 
OECD average 26 31 26 9 8 10 18 22 25 
Consumption taxes Proper^ / and canil tal taxes 
General Selective 
1965 1980 2000 1965 1980 2000 1965 1980 2000 
Denmark 9 22 20 29 13 11 8 6 3 
Netherlands 12 16 17 15 7 9 4 4 5 
Norway 22 18 20 18 16 13 3 2 2 
Sweden 10 13 13 19 9 7 2 1 3 
OECD average 12 14 18 24 16 12 8 5 5 
SOURCE: OECD (1981, 2002a). 
The Personal Income Tax 
The three Scandinavian countries (and these countries alone apart from 
Austria and Finland) have adopted the dual or differentiated income tax (DIT) 
system discussed above, though Denmark largely and Sweden partly have 
abandoned the theoretical DIT and Norway seems likely to follow43. 
All four countries have followed the world-wide trend to reduce PIT rates 
and to widen the PIT base. Paradoxically, in view of the dominance of centre-left 
governments, in the Scandinavian countries the PIT system was probably less 
progressive than elsewhere in the OECD area. Until the recent tax reforms, there 
was unlimited deductibility of interest and restricted or non-taxation of capital 
gains. After tax reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s things have changed. 
Since then, interest payments can be deducted only from capital income in Denmark 
and Sweden and only from ordinary tax in Norway. In Denmark there has been a 
further restriction in recent years on the deductibility of mortgage interest. In the 
Since the 1992 tax reform, the Norwegian tax system has been based on a two-tier structure in 
which income tax is levied on two different concepts of income: general income and personal 
income. In this dual income tax system, capital income earned by personal tax payers is taxed as 
general income at a flat tax rate of 28 percent, whilst income derived from labour and pensions 
are taxed progressively as personal income (top rate 64,7 percent in 2004). Source: Norwegian 
Ministry of finance. 
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Netherlands, as from 2001 interest on loans will no longer be deductible, but other 
notably mortgage interest payments will remain so, although with some limitations. 
There remain differences between the three Scandinavian countries' 
treatment of capital gains: it is integrated with the income tax in Norway and 
Sweden where rates were respectively 28 and 30 per cent44 but not so in Denmark 
where the rate may vary between zero and 40 per cent. At death, capital gains are 
deferred in Denmark and Sweden but exempt in Norway, while capital gains on 
gifts are taxed in Denmark, exempt in Norway and deferred in Sweden. The 
Netherlands remains one of the few OECD countries with no tax on capital gains 
realized outside the area of a personal business. 
Nowadays the tax treatment of the family is fairly similar in all four 
countries. In practice the individual is the tax unit, though Norway provides an 
option for family rather than individual taxation. Parents universally receive cash 
transfers in all four countries. They are not aided through the tax system, except in 
the Netherlands, where a tax credit for children was introduced in 2001. There is no 
tax relief for married45 couples, except for a wastable tax credit for one-earner 
families in the Netherlands which in 2001 replaced a former tax allowance. Tax 
relief was given to qualifying couples by way of a separate schedule in Norway and 
a tax credit in Sweden, in the 1970s. 
Different forms in the four countries, has also taken indexation for inflation 
of the PIT schedule and allowances. It never existed in Norway. In Denmark it 
existed between 1975 and 1983 and applied fully to both the tax schedule (central 
and local) and to tax allowances. In Sweden, it existed between 1979 and 1983 and 
applied only to the central income tax schedule. It was restored in 1990 when 
consumer prices increased by 10 per cent, and since 1994 there has been only 
partial indexation of the tax threshold. In the Netherlands indexation was applied 
both to the tax schedule and allowances after 1971, but in some years it was 
suspended or applied only partially. After 1994, both tax allowances and the tax 
schedule have been fully indexed. 
In Sweden, the PIT is almost entirely a local tax and in Denmark local 
government PIT revenues account for over half of total PIT revenues. In Norway, 
Source: Norwegian Ministry of finance and Fact Sheets on Sweden. Swedish Institute. 2001. 
or qualifying unmarried 
49 
local governments also receive over half of PIT revenues but they have no power to 
change the rates or base of PIT. In the Netherlands the PIT is entirely a central 
government tax. 
PIT and Social Security Contributions 
There is a distinction between integrated and non-integrated social security 
contributions with PIT. Integrated contributions are such, where an identical base 
and threshold is applied to contributions and PIT. Unintegrated contributions refer 
to cases where some other base is used, such as a variant of gross wages (Norway) 
or flat rates without a threshold (Denmark). There is in all the four countries partial 
integration between social security contributions and the personal income tax. 
However, their treatment of these contributions is very different. In Denmark, the 
integration is almost complete, apart from small amounts of employees" 
contributions for pensions and unemployment benefits which account for less than 
3 per cent of total tax revenues (the employers" counterpart representing less than 1 
per cent). In Sweden, the unintegrated part of employees" contributions currently 
represents around 5 per cent of total tax revenues while the employer" s share 
represents nearly a quarter. In Norway, the corresponding figures 7,5 per cent of 
total tax revenues for the unintegrated employees" share and around 10,76 per cent 
for the employers share46. In the Netherlands, as a result of the 1990 tax reform, the 
unintegrated employers" contributions were largely shifted to employees. As a 
consequence, their share fell from around 18 to 6 per cent. In 1990, most of the 
employee contributions were integrated with PIT, but there remain unintegrated 
employee contributions for unemployment and disability insurance. In integrating 
the PIT base and the base of most employees" contributions in the 1990 reform, the 
Netherlands transferred all the contributions that stood to be integrated from 
employers to employees, grossing up employees" wages by the same amount. 
Unlike the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands have insisted on emphasizing 
the essential differences that remain between unearmarked PIT and the PIT 
earmarked for financing some of the social insurances. 
46 Source: Ministry of Finance, Norway (and Account estimates, Revised National Budget 2006 
May 2006.) 
Of the total central government revenue, personal taxes on income and wealth, including 
employee's social security contributions, account, in Norway for about 21 per cent. 
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4.1.2. Four Southern European Countries 
Between 1965 and 1980 three of these four countries (Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain) emerged from non-democratic regimes more or less at the same time, which 
is almost certainly the reason why their total tax ratios stagnated between 1965 and 
1975 and followed the almost identical route of heavy increases between 1975 and 
1983 (Fig. 4). These three countries had the lowest GDP per capita in Western 
Europe. It is thus understandable that they should have exhibited the lowest TTRs 
for most of this period. 
Fig. 4 Changes in tax to GDP ratio47 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, own graph 
But in choosing tax levels also political preferences play their part and by 
1990 the TTR of these Southern European countries was more or less the same as 
the TTR of richer Australia, Japan, and United States and by 2000 it was much 
higher48. 
47 in percentage points 
There is an interesting contrast with the more recent moves towards democratic regimes in 
South America, where TTRs did not immediately increase. It may be that while the welfare state 
was the role model for Greece, Portugal, and Spain, the low-tax United States was the role model 
for Latin America. 
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Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, own graph 
The fourth country, Italy, has been in a different situation. His TTR has been 
more volatile than that of any European country. In 1965, its TTR was among the 
highest in the OECD, in 1975 among the lowest and in 2000 once again among the 
highest (see Fig. 6). This Italian volatility was influenced by many changes of 
government during the post-war period49, variations in its large informal economy, 
major revisions of GDP, and improvements in the tax administration. But to which 
extend each of these changes have had impact on this volatility remains a matter for 
conjecture. 
49 more than fifty 
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Fig. 6 Total tax revenues as percentage of GDP (1965-2003) 
Italy in comparison to OECD average 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, own graph 
In many respects the four countries share with France a Mediterranean 
climate where (Portugal excepted) cigarettes and alcohol are considered necessities 
to be taxed lightly and, given the large share of artisans and farmers in the working 
population, high PIT collection is an impossibility. The tax mix of the four 
countries is otherwise very different. Greece relies most on VAT and social 
security contributions and very unusually in Europe, largely on those of employees. 
Portugal relies to a greater extent on excises than any other OECD European 
country and in Italy and Spain (as in France) employers" social security 
contributions are the greatest revenue raisers. Following the tax reforms in 1970s in 
both Italy and Spain, there has been a move away from these contributions towards 
PIT but these contributions remain well above the OECD average. 
These four countries have followed the overwhelming OECD trend since the 
midl980s to reduce top PIT rates and flatten the schedule, but in contrast to the 
OECD trend, CIT rates in Italy, Portugal, and Spain have not fallen at all and in 
Greece only slightly. There is also little indication of broadening the income tax 
bases of these four countries-again in contrast to what has happened in most OECD 
countries. In Spain, for example, despite an income tax reform in 1998, which 
introduced greater neutrality, the tax system still encourages investment in housing 
and favours long holding periods for investment in life insurance and pension 
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schemes. Still, there remain special regimes for unincorporated business and the 
self-employed. Similarly, attempts have been made in Italy to broaden the tax base 
by taxing capital gains more widely, but legislation has changed frequently. 
The systems of corporate income taxes of these four countries have evolved 
in very different ways. 
Portugal has had some form of shareholder relief for many years. Previously, 
Greece was the only country to have had zero corporation taxation of distributed 
profits whereas now it is zero taxation of dividends. Italy has had in principle an 
imputation system with full credit for many years, but it was not until 1997 that the 
link between tax credit and corporation tax paid was realized in practice. Spain has 
tried both a classical system and relief for distributed profits at the company level, 
but now has shareholder relief. 
As well as being more industrialized than Greece or Portugal, Italy and 
especially Spain face greater pressures for fiscal decentralization. The share of 
local government revenues in TTR in both Italy and Spain has been increasing over 
the last twenty years. 
Along with France, Spain has been the only OECD country to have recently 
introduced and retained a net wealth tax. But otherwise, with the exception of Italy, 
there has been little tax innovation in Southern Europe. In common with most 
countries with a low per capita income, the greatest constraint on tax reform is 
likely to be the capacity of the tax administration to implement it. Lasheros and 
Menendez (1998: 324) summary for Spain probably applies equally to Greece and 
Portugal: 
It is possible to maintain that the main focus of tax reforms during the 
coming years should be on tax administration. The need to modernize the 
administration and to adapt it to the changes that have occurred in recent years 
overshadows the need for other tax changes. 
A similar view is expressed in Castellucci's (1998: 208-12) summary for 
Italy, where attention is drawn particularly to the low quality of the tax 
administration at the level of local government, which is considered to be a major 
constraint on giving local government greater taxing powers. Castellucci also finds 
that Italy's tax reforms evolved quite sensibly on the lines of those of other 
European countries from the basic tax reform of 1973-74 to the early 1990s. 
Subsequently, it has become quite difficult to identify any rationale behind the 
54 
fragmented interventions. These were often disrupting what was built over many 
years, apart from getting more revenue in the short term. 
More recently, Italy introduced a novel method of offsetting the tax incentive 
for corporations to finance investment through debt rather than equity. 
4.1.3. Two Central European Countries 
The tax profiles of Austria and Germany have much in common but there 
remain many differences between them, as with the foregoing groups of countries. 
A main shared feature is the relative stability in their tax levels and tax mix. It is 
true that from 1955 to 1985 Germany was a high-tax country relative to the rest of 
Europe, since when it has become an average European country. Even the 1990 
unification of Germany did not greatly disturb the stability of the German TTR, 
which since 1973 has never been less than 35 per cent, never more than 39 per cent 
of GDP. The Austrian TTR has always during the post-war years been considerably 
higher than the German, but between 1984 and 2000 it remained almost unchanged, 
varying between 41 and 45 per cent (see Fig. 7). 
Fig. 7 Total tax revenues as percentage of GDP (1965-2003) 
Austria and Germany 
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 
Austria Germany 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, own graph 
The tax mix (see Tab. 11) in the two Central European countries has also 
remained stable. As in other countries reliance on social security contributions has 
increased-especially in Germany-and the share of selective consumption taxes 
decreased-especially in Austria. There is little difference between 1965 and 2000 in 
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the two countries regarding the share of the other major revenne sonrees. As we 
may see in the Fig. 9, for exa m p l e , , h e r e l i a n c e o n t a x e s o n i n c o m e a n d p r o f i t s h a s 
not changed since 1965 significantly. 
Fig. 8 Social security contributions as percentage of GDP and of total 
taxation in Austria and Germany (1965-2003) 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 
- — A u s t r i a - Germany OECD Total 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, own graph 
„Austria and Germany have followed the general OECD trend regarding base 
widening and rate lowering of PIT and CIT, but their CIT systems have diverged. 
From 1920, when the German CIT first existed until 1953 when the split rate 
system was introduced (51 per cent on retained and 15 per cent on distributed 
profits), Germany had a classical system. In the mid-1970s, Germany followed the 
French route of an imputation system (with full credit instead of partial credit). 
From 2001, Germany abandoned both the split rate and imputation system in favour 
of dividend relief. On the other hand, Austria had a classical system until 1968 
when a split rate system was introduced. In 1986 Austria added a shareholder relief 
provision and in 1989 abolished the split rate. Thus, as of 2001 Austria and 
Germany have similar systems, but have reached them via very different routes."50 
Fig. 9 shows the development of taxes on incomes and profits in Austria and 
Germany. In the first figure we may see taxes on income and profits as a percentage 
of GDP. Austria was (concerning taxes on income and profits as a percentage of 
GDP) placed close to OECD average, Germany little bit lower, in the 2003. And 
also their share of taxes on income and profits as a ratio of TTR remained quite 
stable in both countries, over this period. 
50 Messere 2003 
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Fig. 9 Taxes on ineome and profits as percentage of GDP and of total 
taxation in Austria and Germany (1965-2003) 
The general consumption tax profiles of Austria and Germany are almost 
identical. Cascade taxes were introduced in Austria in 1923 and Germany in 1916 
and were replaced by VAT in Austria in 1973 and Germany in 1968. In each case, it 
was with a standard rate for most goods and services and, a reduced rate for some. 
The fact that the Austrian standard rate is higher than the German standard rate is 
one reason why the Austrian TTR is higher (see Fig. 7). 
Along with the group of Northern European countries discussed in Section 
4.1.1 , and unlike other European countries, Austria and Germany had net wealth 
taxes dating back to the nineteenth century but these were abolished during the 
1990s. Over the years, the proportion of the base allocated to income, capital, and 
payroll has varied and is very different between the two countries. 
In contrast to the only other OECD European federal state (Switzerland), 
Austria and Germany both operate a tax sharing system negotiated between the 
federal government and the Lander, but in neither country do the Lander authorities 
have much say about the rates and base of the taxes which they share. A big 
contrast between the two countries is that while in Austria around half of TTR 
accrues to the federal government, in Germany the percentage is around 30 per 
cent-well below that of any OECD federal country except Switzerland. 
51 From 1995, the total tax revenues have been reduced by the amount of capital transfer. 
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Since the 1970s successive Austrian governments have been particularly 
active in the field of business taxation, where there has been a search for tax 
neutrality between unincorporated and corporate enterprises and the differing forms 
of capital income. Outside the Nordic countries, Austria has been the only country 
so far to adopt the dual income tax described in Section 3.3.2. 
A unique feature of the German system is the use of mathematical formulae 
to impart progressivity to the PIT system, instead of applying brackets where rates 
increase as income increases, as happens in every other OECD country. Another 
unusual feature of German tax system was the following. To help meet the costs of 
its unification, Germany imposed a one-year-only PIT surcharge in 1991 followed 
by an indefinite PIT surcharge in 1995. This did not much increase Germany s 
TTR. 
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Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2005, own graph 
German tax mix does not differ greatly from an OECD average. The major 
exception is the heavy reliance on social security contributions, and whereas all 
such countries except Greece, the Netherlands, and Switzerland impose the bulk of 
the levy on employers, in Germany the distribution over employers and employees 
approaches 50/50. The consequence is that receipts from employees" contributions 
are higher as a percentage of GDP or TTR in Germany than in almost any other 
OECD country. 
Fig. 11 Employees" and employers" social security contributions as 
percentage of GDP and of total taxation (2003). 
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Despite the high nominal rates of the German CIT (until the tax reform at the 
end of the century), its yield as a percentage of GDP is lower than that of any other 
OECD European country (except Iceland), largely because most enterprises choose 
not to be incorporated (the exact reverse of Japan, see subchapter 4.2.2 - Japan). It 
may well be due to the high rate on undistributed profits. Another reason for the 
low corporate income tax yield may be the erosion of the tax base. 
Fig. 12 Corporate income tax as percentage of GDP, Germany 
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Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2005, own graph 
A major tax reform was enacted in July 2000. Among the changes were: 
• a reduction in the basic rate of PIT from nearly 23 to 15 per cent; 
• a cut in the top PIT rate from 51 to 42 per cent by 2005; 
• a cut in the federal CIT rate from 52 to 39 per cent by 2005; 
• abolition of imputation system and split rate with the replacement of some 
shareholder relief; 
• abolition of capital gains tax on corporate shareholdings as well as on shares 
held by banks and other businesses.52 
4.1.4. Two Western European Countries - Ireland, UK 
We should treat United Kingdom and Ireland separately, but there are also 
some similarities between them, especially as regards the tax mix. United Kingdom 
52 MESSERE (2003) 
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influenced Ireland in many respects. Ireland has been under the British occupation 
during the first twenty-two years of the twentieth century. 
A first similarity is that for most of the century, they have very heavy relied 
on customs and excise duties on cigarettes and alcoholic drinks. This reliance was 
reduced by the introduction of VAT, both in United Kingdom and Ireland, in 1973. 
As of 1955, selective consumption taxes accounted for nearly half of Irish TTR, 
well above any other OECD country. Currently they still account for a greater share 
of revenues than any other OECD country, except Portugal. In 1955 the British 
reliance on selective consumption taxes was also very high, but nowadays it is only 
slightly above the European average. 
A second similarity is that, the British and Irish reliance on taxes on 
immovable property was far greater than that of any other European country until 
around 1975. The British share of revenues from property taxes remains much 
higher than in any other European country, but the Irish share is only slightly above 
the European average nowadays. 
A third similarity in the tax mix of Ireland and the United Kingdom has been 
the low reliance on social security contributions throughout the post-war period. 
The share of revenues from contributions in Ireland has been lower than that of any 
other European country53 and in the United Kingdom it has always been well below 
the OECD European average. 
Another similarity between the two countries is that the share of tax revenues 
accruing to local government in each of them is among the lowest in Europe. Over 
the last fifty years it has been declining for most of the period. They are also two of 
the few countries where the TTR declined during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The explanation for Ireland's extreme tax structure in the 1960s and most of 
the 1970s, apart from its low GDP per capita, was the high proportion of 
agriculture in the economy. Until the late 1970s, most farmers did not pay income 
tax, and, evidently, no social security contributions. The Irish tax system was 
gradually modernized during the 1970s and 1980s. The two most important changes 
were the introduction of VAT in 1973 and the spreading of the income tax net to 
53 Ireland is one of the few OECD countries where most social security benefits are financed by 
voluntary contributions to the private sector. 
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include most farmers during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1978 the property 
tax on households was abolished. 
One consequence of the modernization of the Irish tax system (and tax 
administration) was that between 1965 and 1988 when it peaked, the Irish TTR 
increased from 25 per cent Gust below the overall OECD average) to 39 per cent of 
GDP. Since then it has gradually declined to 31 per cent in 2000. Annual changes 
in the Irish TTR, as well as the various components of it, have been much more 
volatile than in most European countries. The decline in the Irish TTR during the 
1990s is accounted for by a reduction in revenues from social security contributions 
and consumption taxes. Receipts from the income taxes remained unchanged 
despite low rates and various concessions for a number of categories of taxpayers. 
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Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2005, own graph 
Ireland encouraged international tax competition to attract inward investment 
by offering income tax privileges to non-resident individuals and companies. It has 
been criticized (especially in the European Union) that these concessions represent 
unfair tax competition. 
Ireland is currently the fastest-growing economy in the European Union. 
Over recent decades a predominantly agricultural society has been transferred to 
one of advanced technology. How far its competitive income tax policy has 
contributed to this transformation remains a matter for speculation. 
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The British total tax ratio movements have been volatile, as in the case of 
Ireland. The TTR reached a first peak in 1970 at 37 per cent of GDP. During most 
of the 1970s it fell and reached a trough in 1979 at 32 per cent. It then increased at 
the beginning of the Thatcher administration to reach its highest to date in 1982 at 
39 per cent, a far greater decline than in any other OECD country over that period. 
In the following eleven years it decreased to 33 per cent in 1993. After 1993 the 
British TTR increased and reached 37 per cent in 2000 and 35,6 per cent in 2003.54 
After the year 1965, the United Kingdom has changed from being a high tax to a 
relatively low tax country by European standards, but to average in the OECD area 
as a whole (see Fig. 13). 
Over the period 1965-2000, the UK tax mix has changed considerably. There 
has been a considerable drop in the share of PIT revenues. At the same time there 
has been a smaller increase in CIT revenues with the same trend as in other 
countries from selective to general consumption taxes. The United Kingdom was 
also in the vanguard of base-broadening and rate-reducing of the income taxes. 
These trends have later on spread to most OECD countries. 
Fig. 14 PIT, CIT and SSC as percentage of total tax revenues UK (1965-2003) 




Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2005, own graph 
In the Fig. 14, we may see the development of the share of personal income 
tax, corporate income tax and social security contributions since 1965. Personal 
54 OECD Revenue Statistics 2005 
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income taxes were reduced by the structural reform of the end of the 1970s. There 
has been a sharp decrease of PIT especially between 1975 and 1985 from 40 per 
cent to 26 per cent of total tax revenues. In fact they decreased from 14 per cent of 
GDP in 1975 to 11 per cent in 1980, and then they remained stable at around 10,5 
per cent until 2005. Social security contributions have been slightly increasing over 
the whole period. Indirect taxes show a stable pattern over a thirty-year period, 
varying between 14-15 per cent of GDP.55 
Fig. 15 Tax revenue of main headings as percentage of total taxation, 
United Kingdom 2003 























Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2005, own graphs 
The United Kingdom diverges from the rest of Europe in several respects with 
regard to value-added taxation and capital and property taxation (see Fig. 15)56. 
4.1.5. Transitional Economies 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, along with Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Yugoslavia, adopted economic systems based on the Soviet model and also a 
similar tax system, during the period 1945-50. The main features of the tax system 
were: 
55 BERNARDI et al. (2004) 
56 For a more detailed overview of the tax system of UK see MIGALI (2004) 
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• The total tax ratio was usually much higher than that of all OECD countries 
until the early 1990s. For example, in 1989 the TTR was 60 per cent in 
Czechoslovakia, 61 per cent in Hungary, and 40 per cent in Poland.57 
• A very high proportion of tax revenues were collected from state enterprises 
(either by way of taxes on profits or of turnover taxes). The turnover tax was 
essentially a supplementary tax on the profits of the state enterprises, 
because most commodity prices were fixed by the state. 
• Separate turnover tax rates were fixed for different kinds of product, some of 
which also received subsidies. 
This section comments briefly subsequent developments in four transitional 
economies (members of the OECD), namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovak Republic. At the start of the twenty-first century, under a typically 
OECD type tax system the Czech Republic and Hungary have a TTR of around 39 
per cent, about an OECD European average, while the TTR of Poland at 34 per cent 
and Slovak Republic at 31 per cent are well below this average (see Fig. 16 ). 
Fig. 16 Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP 
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Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2005, own graph 
57 For a much fuller summary see Chapter 2 o f MARTINEZ - VASQUEZ and M c N A B (1997) . 
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The tax structures of the four countries differ. They all have a greater than 
average reliance on social security contributions but in the Czech Republic it is far 
higher than any other OECD country (43,6 per cent of TTR, compared to OECD 
average at 26,1 per cent in 2003), whereas Hungary has a greater reliance on 
consumption taxation than nearly all OECD countries (39,4 per cent of Total 
taxation in 2003). All four countries rely less than average on income taxes, Poland 
at 18 per cent and Slovak Republic at 22 per cent of TTR are well below the 
average of OECD in 2003. 
Fig. 17 Tax revenue of main headings as percentage of total taxation, 
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Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2005, own graph 
There has been a complete overhaul of the systems of taxation in these four 
EU acceding countries during the last fifteen years. The opportunity of EU 
membership has had an impact on the process of tax reform in these countries. The 
goal was to harmonize their systems of public finance with those in the EU. It has 
been the most important catalyst of the reforms. 
Introduction of the personal income tax and transformation of the enterprise 
taxes into profit (corporate income) taxes have been among the first (and most 
important) tax reforms. The system of turnover taxes was replaced by value-added 
tax (VAT) and excise taxes. The reorganization of the social security systems, 
pension and health care systems has been the most complex part of public finance 
reforms. 
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Countries have chosen different strategies of tax reforms. Probably the most 
radical reform is the one introduced in Slovakia in 2003. 
Slovakia 
„In 2004 the government implemented a fundamental tax reform which 
unified the rate structure of the tax system by setting the tax rates of the personal 
income tax (PIT), the corporate income tax (CIT) and the value added tax (VAT) all 
equal to 19%. Together with these changes in tax rates many exceptions, 
exemptions and special regimes were eliminated. This reform has made the tax 
system much simpler and more transparent and it is widely judged that its effect on 
the economy will be positive."58 This reform caused that, Slovakia became the first 
OECD country with a flat personal income tax.59 
The government's objectives for the tax reform were: "creation of a business 
and investment friendly environment for both individuals and companies; 
elimination of existing weaknesses and distortionary effects of the tax law; and 
achievement of a high degree of tax fairness by taxing all types and amounts of 
income equally".60 Tax reform was designed to be revenue-neutral with the tax 
reductions in the personal income tax (PIT) and the corporate income tax (CIT) 
being compensated by increases in the VAT thus leading to a shift in the tax burden 
from income to consumption.61 
Income Tax 
Conception of tax reform 2004 - 2006 proposed introduction of flat tax 
system in the field of income tax. It means that all types of personal and corporate 
income are from the January 1, 2004 taxed by one linear tax rate of 19 per cent. 
This tax system has replaced PIT which had its progressive rate structure62 with 
five income brackets with marginal tax rates of 10 per cent, 20 per cent, 28 per 
cent, 35 per cent, and 38 per cent. 
According to MF SR (2005) this radical change has these major advantages: 
58 BROOK and LEIBFRITZ (2005) 
59 Some other Central and Eastern European countries had introduced flat personal income tax 
before, the first countries were Estonia and Lithuania in 1994. 
60 MF SR (2005) 
61 BROOK and LEIBFRITZ (2005) 
62 after the basic exemptions 
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• The flat-rate tax still maintains the progressive nature of effective tax rates 
faced by individuals with different amounts of income. All personal income of 
up to 1,6 times the poverty line will be exempt from taxation.63 Impact of 
introduction of flat tax on direct income will be non-negative on low-income 
earners, negligible in the medium range of income distribution and positive on 
people with the highest incomes. 
• The existence of single marginal tax rate for all income above the standard 
exemption sharply decreases the distortive effect of personal income taxation. 
„This should increase labor productivity both in the short and long term, as it 
encourages higher work effort at any given point in time, as well more 
investment in human capital."64 
Average and marginal personal tax rates declined for many workers. There 
was a replacement of income dependent child allowance with a universal child 
benefit. This has reduced marginal tax rates of workers with children. Reduction of 
the personal income tax makes it easier to comply with the tax code, and reduces 
the incentive to participate in the shadow economy. Total tax wedge on labour 
remains high because of high social security contributions. Incentives for seeking 
work have been strengthened by the reduction in social assistance levels. This high 
tax wedge with a minimum wage (that is high in relation to average wages), means 
that demand for labour is constrained, particularly at the lower end of the labour 
market.65 
The corporate tax was reduced to 19% from the previous rate of 25%. 
According to new tax system, investment and capital gains income are taxed only 
once. Dividend taxation has been cancelled and investment income will be taxed 
only once, at the level of corporate profits.66 
Slovakia had prior to tax reform a standard value added tax (VAT) rate of 
20% and a reduced rate of 14%. Reduced VAT was cancelled entirely and a unified 
63 The effective tax rate for individuals below this threshold will be null. However, the average 
tax rate will start increasing once the individual surpasses this threshold. 
64 MF SR (2005) 
65 OECD: Economic Surveys Slovak Republic (2005) 
66 MF SR (2005) 
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19% rate was introduced for all goods and services. Reduced VAT rates were 
supposed to lead toward the achievement of non-fiscal policy goals (generate lower 
prices, leading to better access by low income groups to basic food and other 
selected goods, or increased consumption of goods). There are doubts on whether 
reduced VAT rates truly support the fulfillment of such objectives in spite of the 
inefficiencies that they introduce. Slovak government decided to replace these 
inefficient fiscal policy instruments with targeted instruments directly in the 
relevant policy areas, such as social policy and health care.67 
Tab. 8 Tax revenue of major taxes as a percentage of GDP, Slovakia. 
% GDP 2002 2006a 
Income tax 6,9 5,0 
Personal income tax 3,4 2,4 
Corporate income tax 2,7 2,2 
Withholding income tax 0,9 0,4 
Value-added tax 7,6 8,4 
Excise taxes 3,1 3,2 
Gift, inheritance, property transfer tax 0,2 0,0 
Local taxes 0,6 0,7 
Road tax 0,2 0,0 
Other tax revenues 0,4 0,1 
Total tax revenues 19,0 17,3 
Source: MF SR (2004) 
"The responses from companies and economists from Slovakia and abroad confirm 
that the fundamental tax reform concept created in the Slovak Republic one of the 
most competitive tax systems in the entire EU and OECD area."68 
4.2. Industrialized OECD Non-Europe 
4.2.1. Two North American Countries USA, Canada 
The total tax ratio of Canada has not been far from the OECD average for 
most of the last forty years. Canada's reliance on income taxes and property taxes 
remains well above the OECD average. Its reliance on social security contributions 
and consumption taxes remains well below the average. There has been an increase 
67 MF SR (2005) 
a estimates of MF SR 
68 MF SR (2004) 
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in PIT and social security contributions and a decrease in the share of consumption 
taxes over the last twenty years. Canada's tax policy is to some extent constrained 
by what happens in the United States. The most obvious example was the imitation 
of the US 1986 Tax Reform that involved rate-lowering and base-widening of the 
income taxes. This was rapidly imitated by most other OECD countries. A more 
unusual example, which is perhaps unique69 to Canada, is its reduction of tobacco 
duties in 1994. Tobacco duties of the United States were so much lower that 
extensive smuggling took place. 
Canada and the United States have made different choices in many ways. As 
regards PIT faced by couples, the individual is the normal unit for Canada and the 
married couple for the United States. As regards CIT, Canada has opted for 
dividend relief and the United States for a classical system. But the most interesting 
and important difference is that Canada is the only OECD country to have a general 
consumption tax at both the federal and provincial levels. The United States is the 
only OECD country to lack a federal general consumption tax. These unique 
features of Canadian tax system are the result of the taxing powers of subnational 
governments, which are greater than those of any other OECD country.70 
Canada has a bewildering mixture of general consumption taxes at the 
federal and provincial levels. Evidently, there is a cost in terms of revenue forgone, 
compliance and neutrality, but Canada has decided that provincial autonomy should 
be given precedence over these drawbacks. Over one-third of tax revenues are 
allocated to the provinces, a far greater share than in any other OECD federal 
country.71 
Canada and the United States are the only OECD countries to have 
subsidized the poor for many years by way of non-wastable PIT credits. Nowadays 
a number of other countries do, but only in recent years. 
The total tax ratio of the United States at 25 per cent of GDP was less than 
one percentage point below the OECD average, in 1965. In 1992, at 27 per cent, it 
was more then eight percentage points below that average. After 1992 the TTR 
69 Despite their great differentiation in rates of excise, high excise European countries have not 
found it necessary to reduce their rates because of cross-border shipping or smuggling. 
70 save perhaps in Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland 
71 BIRD and GENDRON (2001) 
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increased more than in most countries due to a mixture of economic resurgence.72 
Total tax revenues peaked at almost 30 per cent in 2000 and decreased to 26 per 
cent in 2003. It remains, however, below that of countries such as Greece, Portugal, 
and Turkey.73 
Fig. 18 Total tax revenues as percentage of GDP, Canada, USA 
Source: OECD 2005, own graph 
Between 1965 and 2003 income taxes were the most important source of 
United States revenues. There has been a considerable increase in PIT revenues 
from 1985 to 2000, and a decrease thereafter. And there was a corresponding 
decrease in CIT revenues, which declined from 4 per cent of GDP in year 1965 to 2 
per cent in 2003. Revenues from social security contributions have increased 
considerably since 1965 and now approach the OECD average (6,7 per cent USA 
and 9,5 per cent OECD average in 2003).74 Property taxes and consumption taxes 
have both declined over this period. However, whilst revenues from the property 
taxes still represent twice an OECD average, those from consumption taxes at 
around 16 per cent of total tax revenues are the very lowest in the OECD area. Most 
recently, the tax mix has been stable. A further increase of the share of social secu-
rity revenues has been offset by decreases in that of CIT and consumption taxes. 
7 2MESSERE (1998) 
73 OECD (2005) 
74 OECD (2005) 
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Fig. 19 Tax revenue of main headings as percentage of GDP 
USA (1965-2003) 
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Source: OECD 2005, own graph 
The states have the right to impose all the major taxes, except social security 
contributions, at their chosen and very divergent rates, most revenues coming from 
personal income tax and general consumption taxes, usually retail sales taxes. 
Residents of the states have the right to reduce their taxes by referendum. 
The Tax Reform Act 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the most sweeping federal tax legislation 
since the Revenue Act of 1942. It converted the income tax from a tax applying to 
only a few taxpayers to a mass tax applying to the many. It dramatically lowered 
marginal tax rates. For individuals, it cut the top marginal tax rate from 50 to 28 
per cent and for corporations; it reduced the top tax rate from 46 to 34 per cent. To 
achieve a revenue-neutral outcome in the face of reduced marginal tax rates, the 
1986 Act significantly broadened the bases of the individual and corporate income 
taxes. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was revolutionary in the depth of the rate cuts, 
the extent of its base broadening, and the increase in business taxes. It also set the 
stage for the income tax legislation enacted since 1986.75 
75 MESSERE (1998) 
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Despite the 1986 base-widening reform, the US PIT base remains narrower 
than in many other OECD countries. Concessions include tax deductions for 
mortgage interest on secondary homes, medical expenses, charitable donations and 
State taxes as well as a relatively generous treatment of fringe benefits, pensions 
and life insurance contributions. Also the rate-lowering and base-widening of PIT 
in 1986 was reversed during the 1990s.76 
There are two unusual features of the United States^ PIT: 
• First the top rate applies only to the rich, those earning over ten times the 
pay of an average production worker, whereas in most countries it would be 
around two to four times this amount. 
• Second is the existence of an alternative minimum tax. Originally designed 
as a simple way of ensuring the rich pay some tax, this provision has now 
become complicated and through lack of indexation applies also to the 
middle classes.77 
VAT was seriously considered as an alternative to CIT, in the 1960s. During 
the 1970s and 1980s VAT was proposed as a federal consumption tax that would 
enable PIT and CIT to be reduced. Since the late 1980s, however, VAT has not 
been on the political agenda, nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future.78 
Another feature of the US tax system is the extremely low tax component in 
motor fuel prices, alcoholic drinks, and cigarettes relative to other OECD countries. 
In the United States, there is a major problem for tax reform as a result of 
the separation of tax powers not only between the Administration and Congress, but 
also between the Senate and the House, all three often producing different 
proposals.79 Until a last minute agreement the famous 1986 Tax Reform appeared 
doomed for this reason. As Sunley and Stotsky (1998: 426) put it: "Since then 
federal taxation has been budget-driven and much less concerned with the 
fundamentals of taxation". This remained true until the beginning of the twenty-
76 ME S SERE (2003) 
77MESSERE (1998) 
78 SLEMROD (1996) 
79 SLEMROD (1996) 
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first century, when the Bush administration slashed top and bottom rates of the PIT, 
proposed to cut CIT rates, and increased defense expenditure. 
4.2.2. Japan - Development of income taxes 
The aim of this subchapter is to give a brief view of the Japanese tax system. 
For better understanding of the current tax system development, we should describe 
the process of tax reforms, which started in Japan, in mid 1980s of 19th. century. 
These changes have had a considerable impact on the functioning of the tax system. 
Thus, year 1887, when income tax was introduced by national government, can be 
regarded as the beginning of modern Japanese tax system. Although it took the 
modern form only in year 1940, Japan is still regarded to be the pioneer in using 
the income tax. Before income tax became dominant in the overall tax system, land 
tax and indirect taxes created the main part of government revenues. Personal 
income tax and corporate income tax became the major source of Japanese tax 
revenues only after the 1935. Short before the World War 2, Japanese government 
was still relying mostly on indirect taxes. And approximately two thirds of 
governments" total tax revenues were coming from these taxes. To prepare for the 
war economy, Japan has realized the overall tax system reform, in 1940. Whole 
Japanese tax system was strictly rebuilt, which has led to modern tax system based 
mostly on direct taxes. In the same year, personal income tax and corporate income 
tax have been distinguished, both with different tax rates. As a result of this tax 
reform, relative ratio of indirect taxes started to decrease. Further tax reforms were 
following in the post-war period.80 
After certain time interval, one of the significant reforms was the reform of 
the tax system, realized under the Prime Minister Takeshita, in 1987. It consisted 
from the bundle of decreases of income taxes and elimination of saving system free 
of tax. Main aim of the reform of personal income tax was to lower the tax burden 
by drastic reduction of progressive tax rates (on national and local level). General 
80 In 1947, number of tax reforms took place under the influence of the American occupation 
authorities. In 1949, Carl S. Shoup group came to Japan; with the aim of reorganizing of Japanese 
tax system as a whole. 
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opinion has been spread out, that the reform of the personal income tax should be 
based on reduction of marginal tax rates through the income tax base widening. 
Takeshita"s tax reform played a very important role, in the history of 
Japanese tax system. After this reform, which finished with an introduction of 
value added tax in April 1989, the patience was paid to the changes in consumption 
and land tax. Due to these reforms also reforms of the income tax started to work 
and have an impact on the Japanese economy. Since the beginning of 1990s, both 
personal income tax and corporate income tax have been part of gradual tax 
reductions as a tool of a fiscal stimulus.81 Despite of stabilization programs by 
means of fiscal and monetary tools, Japan has had a positive growth till the year 
1999. Also the consumption tax has, from its establishment achieved the constant 
growth, since its establishment in 1989. 
During the post-war period Japan has been a low tax country. In the eco-
nomic bubble boom of the 1980s the Japanese total tax ratio overtook that of the 
United States, but during the downturn of the 1990s it fell behind that of every 
OECD country (see Tab. 9), save for Korea and Mexico. Considering the income 
tax reductions that were made towards the end of the twentieth century and the fact 
that the recession is continuing, it appears that Japan's TTR will continue to 
decline, but there are limits. In 1993, Japan, along with Korea, was the only OECD 
country with a budget surplus. At the end of the 1990s it had the largest deficit of 
OECD countries. 
Japan's reliance on income taxes is below the OECD average (see Fig. 22), 
even though the share of CIT receipts is higher than that of any other OECD 
country (except Luxembourg), despite a considerable drop in the CIT ratio during 
the 1990s. The reason for this is the incorporation of small businesses by the self-
employed. This has been encouraged by tax inducements. Since then, however, with 
the economic recession, both PIT and CIT shares have fallen. Social security 
contributions are well above the OECD average-perhaps a reflection of the fact that 
Japan faces big ageing problem. The share of property tax revenues is among the 
81 These reforms were supposed to stimulate Japanese economy after the longlasting recession. 
This was a result of bursting a bubble and rates of real economic growth were approaching to 
zero. 
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highest in the OECD area and the share of consumption tax revenues the very 
lowest, with the exception of the United States. 
For a unitary country the share of tax receipts allocated to local government 
is very large, but the latter has little discretion over the rates of these taxes. 
An unusual feature of the Japanese PIT was the early creation of a schedular 
system, with especially low flat rates for interest income and capital gains, at a 
time when most OECD countries were moving to a global system. At various times 
attempts have been made to return to a more comprehensive tax base (as advocated 
by the Shoup committee shortly after the Second World War), but these have 
proved unsuccessful. 
For virtually the whole of the post-war period Japan has been governed by 
different factions of the same party82. This is an explanation for the low TTR and 
the narrow base of both PIT and CIT. And it is also an explanation for the too long 
resistance to the introduction of VAT. When VAT was eventually introduced it was 
at the unprecedented low rate of 3 per cent (later increased to 5 per cent)83. 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Japan is also unique in the 
OECD area in having a deflationary rather than inflationary economy, not common 
since the Second World War. 
Income tax 
Main source of revenues are for the Japanese government personal income 
tax and corporate income tax. Both of them created approximately 35 per cent of 
government revenues from taxes and other receipts, in 1988.84 In 2003, it was 30,6 
per cent of total taxation. 85 
82 which largely represented business interests 
83 MESSERE (2003) 
84 TAKATOSHI (1992) 
85 OECD: Revenue Statistics (2005) 
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Fig. 20 Tax revenue of main headings as percentage of total taxation, 
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Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2005, own graph 
In the 2000 PIT alone, created just 21,1 per cent of total tax revenues.86 And it is 
still continuously declining as shown in the Fig. 21. 
Fig. 21 Taxes on incomes and profits as percentage of GDP and Total 
taxation 
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Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2005, own graphs 
OECD: Revenue Statistics (2005) 
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Taxes on personal income as percentage of total taxation in the 
chosen OECD countries, 2003 
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Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2005, own graph 
Basic tax unit 
In pre-war Japan family was considered to be a basic tax unit. It was due to 
the fact, it was generally believed, that the head of the family (mostly husband), is 
responsible for filling the tax refund for the common income (wife and children 
were depending on him). In 1949, Shoup" s tax mission recommended substitution 
of family unit by an individual. Since than, Japan became a country, where an 
individual became the basic tax unit, however certain exceptions have been 
approved. According this system are couples (both of partners working) taxing 
separately. In the couple with children, where just one partner is working, the head 
of the family is considered to be the taxpayer. 
Tax system of Japan is similar to those in Australia and New Zealand, in 
which the individual is still more dominant. It is though in the sharp contrast with 
USA, United Kingdom and France. USA uses family tax unit with different tax 
rates for individuals and couples on the basis of distribution of income. Similarly, 
United Kingdom uses such tax unit, that after all deduction, income of the wife is 
added to her husband's income. France has a special system based on the system of 
quotients, which divide the household income between the family members. 
Because of its variety, connected to the use of tax unit, tax unit should not been 
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able to cause serious problems, in Japan. So, in Japan married couples with the 
same incomes pay different taxes, depending whether they both work, or just one. 
4.3. The Comparative View of the Selected Countries 
The European experiences may be briefly summarized as follows. When we 
look at the structure and evolution of the European tax systems over the past 30 
years, the EU area is peculiar compared with the main international experiences 
outside Europe (US and Japan) and, more generally, compared with OECD area. In 
the EU, the tax burden is, on average, higher than in the OECD area. European 
countries rely more on social security contributions and less on the consumption 
taxes. In social security sector is allocated the higher share of tax revenues and the 
lower share is allocated to sub-national governments. Taxes on labour and their 
contribution to total tax revenues are higher in Europe than in the OECD area. The 
European averages though show marked differences across individual countries. 
Tax ratios, tax structure and the allocation of revenues across levels of government 
differ markedly between selected countries. Up to the mid-1980s, country 
divergences increased considerably, while over the last 15 years the separation 
between individual countries has largely been reversed. Some common trends in the 
recent evolution of tax systems and policies may be identified, essentially a 
traditional rate-cutting, base-broadening reform. No radical tax reforms occurred, 
but some common issues have arisen in the discussion of tax design in the selected 
European experiences. 
Equity. This issue has been rather neglected during the 1980s' season of reforms, 
when tax reforms paced more emphasis on efficiency than on equity. New tax 
measures tried to introduce limited horizontal equity objectives and reinforce 
progressivity. However, they have mainly concerned tax rate cuts not only for the 
bottom income levels, but also for the top levels. 
Competitiveness. Competitiveness is one of the main objectives of many planned 
reforms, which aim at introducing tax measures specifically targeted to increase 
national competitiveness with respect to financial capital, real capital and other 
production factors (mainly labour). 
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Innovation. Tax bases have been broadened in order to introduce tax incentives to 
selectively stimulate innovation and growth in four areas, small firms, R&D 
investments, venture capital and stock options. 
Fiscal relations across government levels. The structure of Fiscal relations across 
government levels is changing in all the analyzed countries, through the 
distribution of tax powers remains to be defined. Recent evidence predicts a lower 
redistributive impact of the whole system in the future. 
4.4. Tax Systems-Structure and Developments 
4.4.1. Comparison of the Tax Ratios of the OECD Countries 
Tax ratio is standardly used for the comparison of the tax burden. Even if it 
is only a rough indicator of the tax burden across time and countries, the ratio of 
taxes to GDP is a useful scaling factor and a signal of the country's preference for 
the size of the public sector.87 
The development of the tax ratio in Czech Republic and other chosen OECD 
countries is shown in the following table. According to OECD from the year 1970 
till the 2000 (see the following table) tax ratios generally increased in OECD 
countries by about 9 per cent and in 15 EU countries by 11,2 percentage points. 
When we look closer to the statistics, we may see, that the above mentioned growth 
has been caused by EU countries, where the tax ratio increased from 30,4 per cent 
in year 1970 to 41,6 per cent in 2000. 
87 In the Czech Republic we distinguish tax rate "narrow"and "wide". It is due to the fact, that 
social and health insurance is sometimes not included into the tax revenues. (According to the 
interpretation of the Tax and tariff low it is not a tax revenue). From the tax comparation point of 
view insurance is considered to be unambiguous a tax revenue. 
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Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP 
Year 1970 1975 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 provisional 
Czech Republic 47% 40,1 % 39,5 % 37,0 % 37,7 % 37,6 % 
Austria 37,7 % 41,9 % 40,4% 41,6% 43,3 % 43,6 % 43,1 % 42,9 % 
Belgium 40,8 % 45,8 % 43,1 % 44,8 % 46,0 % 46,2 % 45,4 % 45,6 % 
Denmark 41,4% 47,7 % 47,1 % 49,4 % 48,4 % 48,7 % 48,3 % 49,6 % 
France88 34,1 % 36,9 % 43,8 % 43,0 % 44,0 % 45,5 % 43,4 % 43,4 % 43,7 % 
Germany89 32,3 % 36,0 % 32,9 % 32,6 % 38,2 % 37,8 % 35,4 % 35,5 % 34,6 % 
Hungary 42,4 % 38,7 % 38,8 % 38,5 % 37,7 % 
Ireland 28,8 % 29,1 % 35,0 % 33,5 % 32,7 % 31,1 % 28,7 % 29,7 % 30,2 % 
Italy 26,1 % 26,1 % 34,4 % 38,9 % 41,2% 42,0 % 42,5 % 43,1 % 42,2 % 
Poland 39,6 % 32,5 % 34,7 % 34,2 % n.a. 
Spain 16,3 % 19,5 % 27,6 % 33,0 % 32,8 % 35,3 % 34,8 % 34,9 % 35,1 % 
United Kingdom 37,0 % 35,3 % 37,7 % 36,8 % 34,8 % 37,7 % 35,6 % 35,6 % 36,1 % 
The Netherlands 35,8 % 41,6 % 42,6 % 43,0 % 41,9% 41,4% 39,2 % 38,8 % 39,3 % 
USA 26,9 % 26,1 % 26,7 % 27,6 % 29,9 % 26,3 % 25,6 % 25,4 % 
New Zealand 31,1 % 33,6% 38,0 % 38,0 % 36,2 % 35,0 % 34,9 % 35,4 % 
Japan 20,9 % 27,4 % 29,1 % 26,7 % 26,5 % 25,8 % 25,3 % n.a. 
EU 15 30,4 % 34,0 % 38,5 % 39,2 % 40,0 % 41,6% 40,6 % 40,5 % n.a. 
OECD total 28,3 % 31,1% 33,8 % 35,0 % 36,1 % 37,1 % 36,4 % 36,3 % n.a. 
Source: OECD (2005) 
The value of the tax ratio is in the Czech Republic above the average value 
of tax rate of OECD countries, while being slightly below the EU countries 
average. 
For the selected 7 OECD countries (Ireland, Italy, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom) the rise in tax ratio has been lower than 
OECD average, about 8 percentage points. 
Tab. 10 Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in 7 selected countries 
Year 1970 1975 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 provisional 
7 selected countries 30,1 % 31,7% 36,9 % 37,7 % 37,9 % 38,6 % 37,9 % 
Source: OECD (2002a) 
88 From 1992, the total tax revenue has been reduced by the amount of the capital transfer that 
represents uncollected taxes. 
89 Unified Germany beginning in 1991. Starting 2001, Germany has revised its treatment of non-
wastable tax credits in the reporting of revenues to bring it into line with the OECD guidelines. 
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The tax ratio trend increase stopped in the 2000 and since then we may see 
slightly declining trend in OECD countries. The same was the case of the 7 selected 
countries after the 2000, till the 2002 apart from Italy the data show light 
decreasing trends in tax revenues. 
The trends have been different over time and between countries. In the 
period 1970-2000, the ratio increased in six countries (Spain, Germany, UK, Italy, 
the Netherlands and France) and stayed constant in Ireland. The figures for Italy 
and Spain are the highest, in these countries; the 1970 ratios were the lowest. On 
average, both in the OECD countries and in the 15 EU countries, the main portion 
of these changes occurred during the 1970s and, to a lesser extent, during the 
1980s. The pattern of individual countries has been different. In Italy, the increase 
in the tax-to-GDP ratio was higher during the 1980s than in the previous decade. In 
the 1990s, up to 2000, while the ratios decreased markedly in Ireland and the 
Netherlands, in France, Germany and Spain they were at that time increasing. In the 
same decade Italy registered the highest increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio (from 38,9 
per cent to 42 per cent). The figures suggest that the tax ratios of individual states 
moved closer to the average. However, since the year 2000 the difference between 
the highest ratio (France) and the lowest (Ireland) still remains significant, more 
than 13 percentage points. In the EU area, the tax burden is on average higher than 
in the OECD area and the difference during the period 1970-2000 has increased 
from 2,1 to 4,2 percentage points. 
4.4.2. Comparison of the Tax Structure of OECD Countries 
Although tax-to-GDP ratio is simple and important for the comparison of the 
level of taxation between the countries, it covers just one aspect of taxation. It does 
not say anything about how is the structure of the tax ratio and from which objects 
are taxes levied. Taxes can be levied on these objects: Incomes (revenues), 
consumption and property. More subtle classification uses the OECD statistics, 
90 which divides taxes into six main groups . 
As the total tax ratio has risen sharply, the tax structure by legal tax 
categories, measured as the distribution of tax revenue among major taxes (income 
90 Which are further divided into the subgroups 
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taxes, taxes on goods and services, social security contributions and property taxes, 
has changed over time (see Tab. 11). 
The tax structure of the OECD area currently differs from that of the 
European area mainly in respect of two items: social security contributions (higher 
in the EU countries) and taxes on goods and services (lower in the EU countries). 
The differences between the two areas decreased though in the last two decades. 
In EU 15 the tax mix in the 2003 was composed of taxes on goods and 
services (30,4 per cent), social security contributions (28,8 per cent), taxes on 
incomes and profits (33,2) and property taxes (5,2 per cent).91 In the last two 
decades a shift has occurred from the personal income tax and social security 
contributions to the corporate income tax and property tax. 
The seven selected countries vary in the importance of these main revenue 
sources. In the UK and Ireland, income taxes and consumption taxes account for 
a much higher share of total tax revenues, while social security contributions 
account for approximately half of the European average (see Tab. 11). Italy reflects 
exactly the average European model of taxation, while the remaining countries are 
all characterized by the fact that they rely heavily on social security contributions 
and less on the personal income tax (France, Spain, and Netherlands) or on 
corporate income tax and property taxes (Germany). 









Property Goods and service 
1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 
France 11,6 18,0 5,1 7,0 44,9 38,4 4,8 6,8 30,4 25,8 
Germany 29,6 25,3 5,5 4,8 34,5 39,0 3,3 2,3 27,1 28,1 
Ireland 32,0 30,8 4,5 12,1 14,5 13,6 5,3 5,6 43,7 37,2 
Italy 23,1 25,7 7,8 7,5 38,6 28,5 3,7 4,3 26,5 28,4 
Netherlands 26,3 14,9 6,6 10,1 38,1 38,9 3,6 5,4 25,2 29,0 
Spain 20,4 18,7 5,1 8,6 48,6 35,1 4,6 6,4 20,7 29,8 
United Kingdom 29,4 29,2 8,4 9,8 21,0 16,4 12,0 11,9 29,2 32,3 
OECD total 31,3 26,0 7,6 9,7 23,5 25,7 5,3 5,4 32,3 31,6 
EU 15 29,0 25,6 5,8 9,2 30,4 28,4 4,2 5,0 31,0 30,0 
selected countries 24,6 23,2 6,1 8,6 34,3 30,0 5,3 6,1 29,0 30,1 
Source: OECD (2002a). 
91 Source: OECD (2005) 
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Within the EU some countries (Tab. 9) show higher tax burden than the 
European average (France), while others are in opposite situation (Germany, 
Ireland, Spain and the UK), in 2000. In France this is explained by the relatively 
higher incidence of social security contributions and property taxation, while both 
corporate and income taxes are under the European average. We may find lower tax 
burden in Anglo-Saxon countries. It is mainly due to the incidence of social 
security contributions, while in Germany and Spain direct taxes and taxes on goods 
and services are under the European average. In the countries where tax-to-GDP 
ratio increased during the 1990s (France, Germany, Italy and Spain), the largest 
part of the increases has taken the form of higher personal and corporate income 
taxes (France), social security contributions and consumption taxes (Germany and 
Spain), while Italy used a mix of increases in the personal income tax, property and 
consumption taxes. 
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5. Future Tax Systems 
Introduction 
This concluding chapter offers a few guesses on how tax systems might 
evolve over the next fifteen to twenty years. Tax policies will to some extend 
depend on policy goals that governments want to achieve. Probably more relevant 
to future tax trends is what governments find it feasible to do in the tax area. 
Among the more important constraints upon them will be the state of their economy 
(rates of GDP growth and inflation and the level of employment), the impacts of 
economic integration within the European Union, the uncertain outcome of the 
continuous struggle between tax officials and tax avoiders and evaders, 
globalization, the ageing of population. 
In this chapter, it is assumed that during the next fifteen to twenty years: 
• the economic cycle, employment and GDP growth will continue much as in 
the last twenty years; 
• inflation/deflation rates will be sufficiently close to zero as not to affect long 
term tax revenue trends substantially; 
• the greater sophistication of tax officials and tax avoiders/evaders will more 
or less cancel each other out, so that these will have no great impact on 
overall tax levels. 
These assumptions do not necessarily apply to any particular country. They 
just represent an overall assessment. For example, it may be that in countries with 
poor tax administrations the impact of their greater administrative sophistication 
will be offset by greater tax evasion through the Internet in other countries. 
This chapter begins with what is likely to affect revenues from the main 
taxes, and next continues to some forecasts about what might happen to overall tax 
structures and tax levels. The chapter then addresses the related question of 
whether the forces making for convergence of tax levels, tax structures and tax 
rates are likely to prevail over those than can make for divergence. 
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5.2. The Future of the Main Taxes 
Personal Income Tax 
In my opinion, most industrialized countries will remain with the personal 
income tax (PIT) as one of their major sources of revenue. Country changes will 
doubtless vary according to their present tax system and the political, social, and 
economic preferences of their governments. Much of the trend of the 1980s and 
early 1990s reflected the presence of governments of the radical right in the United 
Kingdom and the United States and some temporary replacements of social 
democratic regimes in Scandinavia. 
During the late 1990s left wing governments came into power in some of the 
major European economies with slight increases in PIT ratios, as also happened 
under the Clinton administrations in the United States. Overall, however, the share 
of PIT revenues in GDP and total tax revenues fell during the 1990s. On the 
contrary, with the development of communications technology, PITs are probably 
going to be more difficult to collect. More and more employees, previously subject 
to withholding tax on their wages or salaries, will become self-employed, working 
at home on their computers, with all the possibilities of reducing tax liabilities that 
such a change in economic status will provide. 
A distinction between taxing labour income and capital income should be 
made. It is not very likely for most workers in industrialized countries to be 
geographically mobile between countries over the next fifteen years or so, whereas 
the sources of capital income are already mobile. 
It may be assumed that more countries will follow the mini-trend of partial 
integration of PIT and social security contributions and PIT and transfer payments 
via non-wastable tax credits, in order to reduce the poverty and employment traps 
and tax discrimination against low paid labour. 
Corporate Income Tax 
Over the last forty years, corporation tax revenues have remained more or 
less stable on average as a percentage of GDP, though there have been many short-
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term country fluctuations reflecting political preferences and the state of the 
economy.92 
It would not be surprising if the rate-lowering, base-broadening trend that 
began in the mid-1980s were to continue. Rate-lowering because this is where 
domestic pressures are concentrated, which are reinforced by international 
competition. Base-broadening because of revenue needs. 
Radical change of the tax system creates many complications and is never 
undertaken lightly, so that it seems unlikely that the fashion of the 1970s and early 
1980s for partial integration of corporate and PIT via imputation systems will be 
revived.93 
More countries may be heading towards introducing a variant of the 
„classical system" with lower nominal CIT rates and dividends subject to a flat PIT 
rate. The EU Commission made proposals in 2001 to harmonize the CIT base of its 
fifteen Member States, but it seems unlikely that these will be accepted. 
Social Security Contributions 
It seems probable that the trend over the last forty years to implement an 
income support approach will persist. Much depends on how far governments can 
continue to find mileage in the social insurance approach in persuading their 
citizens to increase payments. 
It seems doubtful whether the future workforce will continue contributing as 
large a share of tax revenues as has been the case in the past. Working generations 
may also be satisfied with the idea of greater individual entitlements to social 
security, with a likely shift from public pay-as-you-go systems to privately or 
publicly funded provisions. 
Consumption Taxes 
It seems that the value-added tax is going to stay the general consumption 
tax of all countries, except the few (India, United States) where the existence of 
sub-national 
governments" sales taxes is probably the main reason for its absence. 
92 OECD Revenue Statistics (1965-2004) 
93 MESSERE (2003) 
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EU Directives will continue to influence government choices (of whether the 
base should be extended and whether a single rate should be adopted) in the 
twenty-five Member States of the European Union, but domestic political pressures 
will probably take precedence. 
Small increases to the standard rates of tax, which usually apply to the great 
majority of goods and services, have occurred in nearly all VAT countries over the 
last thirty years and, as this is probably the easiest and least painful way of increas-
ing government revenues, will most probably continue to do so. 
Pressures may increase to subject environmentally friendly and labour-
intensive economic activities to reduced rates of VAT. Evasion of VAT as well as 
income tax through manipulation of the new electronic commerce is already taking 
place and is likely to increase, and evasion of VAT on domestic services will also 
doubtless continue. 
Property and Capital Taxes 
The future of net wealth taxes looks doubtful, given the fears of capital flight 
that appear hard to stem even with improved exchange of information between 
national tax administrations. Taxes on bequests yield relatively little revenue and 
are frequently avoided, and their future may also be insecure, as suggested by their 
recent removal in Italy and the United States.94 
The future of the taxes on immovable property is very much bound up with 
the relative taxing powers of national and sub-national levels of government, 
something which varies greatly from country to country and is likely to continue to 
do so in the future. This is a revenue source recently (re)discovered by a number of 
countries and its share in tax revenues may well increase since, unlike capital and 
its owners, land and buildings are not mobile. On the other side, highly visible 
property taxes are unpopular with the electorate and politicians may decide it is 
wiser to reduce such taxes, or even not to raise them. 
94 OECD (2005) 
88 
5.5. Will tax systems converge? 
A distinction should be made between tax levels, structures, rates and 
systems of countries coming closer together (tax convergence) and exhibiting 
common trends. It is evident that terms, such as convergence and harmonization are 
not synonymous in this context.95 
There are at least four separate reasons for believing that a convergence of 
the different tax levels and structures of countries will occur. First, to gain 
taxpayers" consent to increased levels of taxation, diversification of revenue 
sources may be necessary. Second, international tax competition may force income 
tax rate to its reductions. Third, the development of the electronic communications 
technology is likely to transform the markets for consumer goods and labour of 
most industrialized countries. With such consequences, some kinds of tax will be 
more difficult to collect than others. Fourth, there is the EU Commission's 
insistence that, as long as the tax levels and tax structures of Member States remain 
so diverse a single economic market is unachievable. 
Different questions include how far globalization and other international 
factors are likely to compel tax convergence or continuation of common trends both 
within the European Union and among industrialized OECD countries generally. 
Question is also, how far are national governments likely to remain free to take 
their tax policy decisions exclusively or primarily on domestic grounds. Importance 
of these international factors on tax convergence in the recent past has been 
somewhat exaggerated, though they have been partially or even largely responsible 
for certain common trends. 
As regards the European Union there remains much resistance among 
Member Country governments to take particular decisions that would be unpopular 
in their own countries. Initially, tax convergence prevailed, largely as a result of 
previously low-taxed countries of Southern Europe catching up on the more highly 
taxed countries of North and Central Europe. This trend was discontinued during 
95 For example, if VAT rates and revenues increase by more than the rates and revenues of other 
taxes, and this happens to countries with an already above average reliance on VAT revenues and 
above average VAT rates, this would represent divergence between such countries and other 
countries, and not convergence. 
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the 1990s when there are some clear indications of tax divergence between EU 
Member States, with increases in the TTRs of some highly taxed countries and a 
slowdown in some lower taxed countries in Southern Europe. 
It seems that EU membership does not have too much influence on rate 
convergence. For example, there was no convergence of VAT rates between 1987 
and 1995 in the EU.96 Also, there are a number of recent examples of EU country 
governments insisting on retaining their tax sovereignty. Under the 1992 EC Rates 
Directive, countries with zero VAT rates on certain goods are entitled to keep them 
for a 'transitional period', but the abolition of zero rating on around a quarter of UK 
consumer expenditure has never been on the agenda of either the previous or 
present British government. The detrimental effects of widely differing excise rates 
between neighboring countries in terms of economic distortions and significant 
revenue losses due to legal and illegal cross-border shopping are well known. 
However, a drastic change to excise rates in the countries involved (e.g. Denmark, 
France, and the United Kingdom) would apparently pose even greater problems for 
their governments, since there have been no clear signs of high-excise countries 
decreasing or low-excise countries increasing excise rates. 
There are some opinions within the EU suggesting that taxes should be 
harmonized in the European Union97. The way in which supporters of tax 
harmonization tend to think is, however, severely flawed. EU member states should 
even in the future be allowed to set taxes on a national level. Free decision on 
national tax rates and consequently tax competition are beneficial for a number of 
reasons. These benefits will be illuminated onwards. 
Those who oppose tax competition98 often refer to the welfare costs of 
harmful tax competition that creates fiscal externalities on neighbor countries such 
as tax base flight to escape high taxation. A number of German companies for 
instance have threatened to transfer production to Eastern European countries due 
to the tax and wage cost benefits. Therefore supporters of tax harmonization argue 
96 KEEN and SMITH (1996) 
97 supporters of the idea of the Single Market 
98 Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, has made it clear in speeches and newspaper 
articles that the UK will resist proposals to harmonize direct tax regimes across the EU. The UK 
will also resist any attempt to introduce majority voting on tax issues, insisting on retaining its 
veto (International Tax review). 
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a race to the bottom will eventually occur. This assumption is, however, doubtful 
since lowering taxes is mainly an important instrument for emerging economies to 
stimulate economic growth. Nevertheless in the foreseeable future there will be a 
growing demand for public spending in the new member states, coming from 
different sources, e.g. improvement of the infrastructure. Thus a race to the bottom 
is highly unlikely as they will need to raise taxes in order to afford the 
improvements. Moreover, tax competition is beneficial for the entire European 
Union since it forces governments to charge efficient tax prices for their public 
services. 
Tax Harmonization vs. Tax Competition 
It is frequently argued that the purpose of tax harmonization is to prevent 
unfair competition. Occasionally, supporters of tax harmonization refer to this as 
fiscal dumping." France and Germany hence feel that they have to harmonize 
corporate tax rates by setting a minimum rate applicable across the European Union 
to avoid such fiscal dumping. A number of new member states of the European 
Union such as Slovakia reduced tax rates and as a result they have been able to 
attract increasing volumes of investments from European and American 
multinational companies. Such foreign investments are essential for the future of 
these emerging market economies. 
Since tax matters have to be decided unanimously in the European Union, it 
is highly unlikely that tax harmonization will be accepted by new member states 
experiencing high economic growth rates. Therefore, the most obvious purpose of 
recent statements from French and German politicians is presumably to encourage 
Eastern European to raise their corporate taxes. Nevertheless, their actual influence 
on the tax policies of these countries is limited, even though these West European 
countries are net contributors of the EU budget and can thus threaten to decrease 
regional aid. Germany for instance has noted that new member states receive 
billions of euros in infrastructure, agricultural, and other subsidies from the EU 
budget which is largely funded by German citizens, i.e. taxpayers. The German 
99 Germany has reopened the ongoing debate about European tax harmonization. It accused 
neighboring Austria of fiscal dumping in order to poach investment from companies looking to 
lower their tax burden (Tax-News.com) 
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Economics Minister Wolfgang Clement has recently said he might demand cuts in 
the subsidies if the new member states do not raise their taxes.100 The budget is in 
fact the good way in which a country like Germany could somehow influence the 
tax policy of the new member states. Similar comments have been made by Nicolas 
Sarkozy, the former French Finance Minister.101 
Eastern European economic growth has, however, become a reality not only 
due to low taxes. Low labour costs and a relatively efficient productivity also add 
to the region's appeal to foreign investors. This aspect also needs to be considered 
in the ongoing debate. 
Furthermore, it is imperative to emphasize how lower taxes help new 
members of the EU attract more businesses so they can catch up with the rest of 
Europe and the rest of the industrialized world. The best way to increase tax 
revenues is definitely encouraging business growth, not forcing states to increase 
their corporate tax rates. On the contrary, Germany could learn a lesson or two 
from the Eastern European pro-growth tax policy and how tax competition and 
fiscal reform can stimulate the economy. 
Since harmonized tax rates eliminate fiscal competition, much like a price-
fixing agreement, it hinders the efficient allocation of capital and labour, slowing 
overall economic performance. 
Tax competition, on the other hand, facilitates economic growth by 
encouraging policymakers to adopt sensible tax policy. It is not a big surprise that 
high-tax nations dislike tax competition (Germany, France), since they tend to be 
the ones suffering most of such competition. Tax harmonization is mostly 
associated with higher fiscal burdens. 
Academic research in the field of tax harmonization (presumably with a high 
fiscal burden) vs. tax competition clearly indicates that tax competition is more 
beneficial with regard to economic growth. There are also a number of examples 
from the real world that widely corroborate the academic evidence. Among such 
examples are the Thatcher/ Reagan tax rate reductions. 
100 www.businessweek.com 
101 According to http://news.bbc.co.uk, Sarkozy said that those EU countries with lower taxes than 
old Europe should not receive EU subsidies. 
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In more recent European history, the Irish miracle is a notable example of 
the benefits of tax competition. The corporate tax rate reduction in Ireland has 
yielded remarkable results. Less than 20 years ago Ireland was known as the "sick 
man of Europe" with high unemployment. Corporate tax rates were around 50%. In 
the 1990s tax rates were slashed. The corporate tax rate in Ireland is today only 
12.5% and these tax rate reductions have yielded enormous benefits to Ireland. The 
economy grew by an annual average of 7.7% in the 1990s. During the late 90s the 
economic growth was particularly impressive with over 9% growth. As a 
consequence Ireland has become the "Celtic Tiger" in a relatively short time. The 
Irish example has also encouraged other European countries to drop their tax rates. 
According to the Wall Street Journal average corporate tax rates have dropped to 
30%. 1 0 2 
Some Eastern European countries, such as the Baltic nations, introduced flat 
tax rates in the 1990s. Russia followed suit in 2001, Slovakia in 2004. And good 
tax policy is having a desirable impact in these countries. Not only have foreign 
investors been attracted to the new member states, but tax compliance has also 
improved significantly. Inflation adjusted income tax revenue in Russia for 
instance, has grown by about 60%. It seems as if people are willing to produce 
more and pay their taxes when the system is less opaque and tax rates are low. A 
sudden tax harmonization with a higher tax level would be harmful to these 
currently prospering countries. 
Tax Harmonization and Economic Theory 
Supporters of tax harmonization frequently refer to the theory of Capital 
Export Neutrality and argue that in a world with no taxes the most efficient 
allocation of resources based on economic criteria will occur. Thus tax 
harmonization is required to prevent distortions of competition, particularly of 
investment decisions and to create a level playground. Nonetheless, most 
economists argue that the economic benefits of tax competition and lower tax rates 
enhance economic efficiency. There is strong evidence that the economic benefits 
102 The Irish Taxation Institute 
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of lower tax rates exceed the theoretical economic cost of the misallocation of 
resources associated with different tax rates.103 
Furthermore, economic theory states that competitive markets result in price 
convergence since producers discover that they will lose customers if they charge 
more than the market price and lose earnings if they charge less than the market 
price, thus tax rates will tend to converge and concerns of a race to the bottom are 
hence not justified. 
Tax harmonization is in essence designed to hinder the flow of capital and 
jobs from high-tax countries to low-tax countries and to protect countries with high 
tax rates such as Germany and France. Precisely this policy is, however, contrary to 
economic liberalization and means less economic growth for the region. 
Tax competition, on the other hand, encourages the government and policy 
makers to make the right decisions effectively. Moreover, flat tax rates seem to be 
the best way to stimulate an economy as seen in the new EU member states. To 
eliminate the right for these states to determine their fiscal policy, especially 
during their period of catching up to the Western European states would be a severe 
setback for the whole region and its economic growth prospects. 
103 International Tax Review, Herbert Smith UK: Chancellor rejects tax harmonization 
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Below are the corporate taxes of some EU member states: 
Tab. 12 Corporate tax rates in OECD countries 
Corporate . Corporate Rank in Percentage 
Country Tax Rate in Tax Rate in March ^ d u c t . o n .n 
2000 2 0 0 0 2006 2006"* Corporate 
Rate 
Germany 52.0 1 38.9 3 -25.2% 
F r a nce 37.8 7 35.0 5 -7.4% 
Belgium 40.2 4 34.0 7 -15.4% 
l l a ' y 37.0 9 33.0 8 -10.8% 
Greece 40.0 5 32.0 10 -20.0% 
Netherlands 35.0 11 31.5 11 -10.0% 
Luxembourg 37.5 8 30.4 12 -18.9% 
Denmark 32.0 18 28.0 17 -12.5% 
Portugal 35.2 10 27.5 20 -21.9% 
Czech Republic 31.0 19 26.0 22 -16.1% 
Finland 29.0 24 26.0 22 -10.3% 
Austria 34.0 14 25.0 24 -26.5% 
Poland 30.0 21 19.0 26 -36.7% 
Slovak Republic; 29.0 24 19.0 26 -34.5% 
Hungary 18.0 30 16.0 29 -11.1% 
Ireland 24.0 29 12.5 30 -47.9% 
Source: OECD data as of March 29, 2006, located at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/56/337i7459.xls. 
It is worth noting that tax breaks for the largest companies are common in 
some countries. Various loopholes also lead to the fact that effective corporate 
taxes often differ from the official corporate tax rates. A flat tax rate would 
simplify the calculation of tax bills. The supporters of tax harmonization 
nevertheless most often argue that those countries with low corporate taxes should 
raise their taxes and harmonize taxes at the German/ French level, not at the lower 
level of the new member states. For this reason tax harmonization is often 
associated with higher taxes and a harmonized low corporate tax rate is not even 
considered feasible. 
Conclusion 
Recent empirical research indicates that higher marginal tax rates and 
progressive tax systems have a negative impact on economic growth in 
industrialized countries. Germany and France are prime examples. Irish and Eastern 
European economic growth rates, on the other hand, are real world evidence of the 
success of lower corporate taxes. In the ongoing debate about tax harmonization in 
104 Rank of all OECD countries 
105 Rank of all OECD countries 
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the European Union, supporters of tax harmonization are mostly associated with a 
higher fiscal burden, meaning higher corporate tax rates, while those in favour of 
tax competition are most often supporters of lower tax rates. It is obvious that West 
European countries at least to some extent criticize tax systems of Eastern 
European countries for unfair tax competition to divert attention from the urgent 
need to clean up their own tax systems. Therefore it is highly important to keep in 
mind the real interests and motives of the protagonists in this debate. 
Furthermore, tax harmonization may lead to a democratic deficit of the EU 
member states since national decision-making would be seriously compromised if 
tax harmonization was implemented. The monetary policy of EU member states is 
already being conducted by the European Central Bank in Frankfurt. If member 
states were to lose control of their fiscal policy in addition to not being able to 
determine monetary policy on a national level, the consequences could be severe 
for the economic growth of the whole region. 
In order to support the economic growth of the new EU members it is 
important to maintain the current right to determine corporate taxes on a national 
level. Member states must be allowed to use this instrument in the future in order to 
stimulate growth if a country wishes to do so. Different tax policies are required at 
different stages of development and especially in the European Union the member 
states are not at equal stages of development. 
Apart from the influence of the European Union, there is little evidence that 
other international factors (such as economic globalization and international tax 
competition) have until now dominated domestic tax policy choices, with several 
important exceptions. International factors have been mostly responsible for the 
almost universal reduction of nominal top rates of the PIT and of PIT rates on 
capital income, for the reduction of nominal corporation income tax rates in many 
countries as well as the fall in net wealth taxes. 
There has been one major example in recent times of one country's changes 
provoking similar changes in a number of other countries. That is the rate-lowering 
and base-widening of the personal and corporate income tax in the 1986 US Tax 
Reform Act. 
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We may wonder how much effect the tax competition aspect had when such 
major economies as France, Germany, Italy, and Japan106 did not follow the 
example set by the United States until ten to fifteen years had passed. It does 
appear to be the only major case in the 1985-2000 period of one country's tax 
legislation influencing directly those of many other countries. 
106 Canada, which probably had no other choice, followed USA. 
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6. Conclusion 
The primary aim of the paper was to examine tax developments of the OECD 
countries over the last forty years. The OECD experiences may be briefly 
summarized as follows: 
Between most of Europe and industrialized OECD non-Europe there has been 
a wide difference of the role of government, which has accelerated over the last 
three decades. European countries107 have been much closer to the question of 
welfare state and this is shown most clearly in differences in their total tax ratios. 
Fifty years ago there was some correlation between total tax revenues levels and 
GDP per capita. This is now far from the case, when relatively poor countries like 
Greece and Portugal have a higher TTR than Japan and the United States. Another 
major difference between OECD Europe and industrialized OECD non-Europe is 
the tax structure. 
When we look at the structure and evolution of the European tax systems 
over the past 30 years, the EU area is peculiar compared with the main international 
experiences outside Europe (US and Japan) and, more generally, compared with 
OECD area. As the thesis has shown, the tax burden is in EU, on average, higher 
than in the OECD area. European countries rely more on social security 
contributions and less on the consumption taxes. To a much greater extent, non-
Europe relies on different revenue sources, personal income taxes and taxes on real 
estate. 
Taxes on labour and their contribution to total tax revenues are higher in 
Europe than in the OECD area. The European averages though show marked 
differences across individual countries. Tax ratios, tax structure and the allocation 
of revenues across levels of government differ markedly between selected 
countries. 
How far are globalization, and other international factors likely to compel 
tax convergence or continuation of common trends both within the European Union 
and among industrialized OECD countries generally? Question is also, how far are 
107 except Ireland and Switzerland 
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national governments likely to remain free to take their tax policy decisions 
exclusively or primarily on domestic grounds. 
The base-widening and rate-lowering of the income taxes may well continue 
over the years to come. Good arguments remain for such moves and in addition, the 
public, the media and politicians seem more concerned with nominal rates than with 
the less transparent tax base. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the few common trends may well continue, 
but otherwise there is no reason to believe that the tax structures of countries will 
come much closer together over the next ten to fifteen years. It may be expected 
that governments will continue to make most of their choices on tax matters largely 
on domestic grounds. They will also make their decisions without much reference 
to the choices of other countries or international developments, including those in 
the European Union. Judging by the recent past, future convergence of revenue 
trends seems more likely than divergence. However, divergence will sometimes 
occur because, for example, low-tax countries like Australia, Japan, and the United 
States might prefer to make smaller increases (or even larger decreases) to their 
total tax ratios compared to other countries. 
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Thesis 
Development and Differencies in Structure of Tax Revenues in the 
OECD Countries, with an Emphasis on Personal Income Tax. 
Characteristics: 
Master Thesis will examine tax systems developments of the OECD countries. It will also 
describe similarities and differences between the main choices of the OECD countries, with 
regard to tax levels, structures and systems. The paper will also try to pick up some choices 
made by particular countries, not to be found elsewhere. 
The paper will provide comparisons between the countries, concentrating in particular on how 
far common trends and attitudes have emerged, how far countries have gone their own way 
and seem likely to continue to do so over the next few years. It will further point out 
differences in structure of tax revenues in the chosen OECD regions. 
Methodology 
• Data collection 
• Distribution and sorting out the data into particular units 
• Outline 
• Description of particular tax systems 
• Similarities and differences 
• Questions, answers 
• Summarization 
• Conclusion 




• Description chapters 
• Core - differences in structure of tax revenues 
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